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INTRODUCTION 
hen the Supreme Court upheld extended copyright terms in El-
dred v. Ascroft,1 many Internet activists called for renewed po-
litical action in the form of appeals to Congress or even a cam-
paign to amend the Constitution. But others suggested a very different 
course: They argued that it would be wiser to forgo institutions con-
trolled by the powers of the past, and to return instead to the keyboard to 
write the next generation of “law-busting” code. In the words of one ob-
server, “tech people are probably better off spending their energy writ-
ing code than being part of the political process” because “[t]hat’s where 
their competitive advantage lies.”2 
The idea that computer code may be emerging as a meaningful in-
strument of political will remains one of the most evocative and poorly 
understood propositions in the study of law and technology. The promi-
nent effects of computer code have made it difficult to ignore the fact 
that code can be used to produce regulatory effects similar to laws. 
Hence, the popularity of Professor Lawrence Lessig’s idea that (for 
computer users at least) “code is law.”3  
But what this really means remains extremely vague. The subject re-
mains the focus of grand speculation, ranging from claims that computer 
 
1 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003). 
2 Declan McCullagh, Geeks in government: A good idea?, at http://news.com.com/ 
2010-1071-949275.html (Aug. 12, 2002) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) 
(quoting Sonia Arrison of the Pacific Research Institute). 
3 See Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace 89 (1999). 
W 
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code will arise as a kind of utopian sovereign to improve on perceived 
failures of state regulation, 4 to concerns that code may be used to negate 
basic freedoms,5 and, of course, the claim that nothing of legal novelty 
has happened, or perhaps ever will happen. 6 
Most problematically, none of these understandings of code and law 
explains a central issue: compliance. Specifically, they do not explain 
the shifting patterns of legal compliance in the 2000s. Explosions of 
non-compliance in areas such as copyright, pornography, financial 
fraud, and prescription drugs fuel the sense of a legal breakdown, yet the 
vast majority of laws remains unaffected. The mixed compliance pattern 
finds little explanation in the concept that “code is law” or in notions 
that technological self -help can offer a substitute for legal systems.7 
This Article proposes a new and concrete way to understand the rela-
tionship between code and compliance with law. I propose to study the 
design of code as an aspect of interest group behavior: as simply one of 
several mechanisms that groups use to minimize legal costs. Code de-
sign, in other words, can be usefully studied as an alternative to lobbying 
campaigns, tax avoidance, or any other approach that a group might use 
 
4 These claims are described and discussed in Timothy Wu, When Law & the Internet First 
Met, 3 Green Bag 2d 171, 172–73 (2000). See also Tom W. Bell, Escape from Copyright: 
Market Success vs. Statutory Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. Cin. L. 
Rev. 741 (2001) (arguing that the efficacy of technological self-help should allow voluntary 
exit from the copyright regime); Kenneth W. Dam, Self-Help in the Digital Jungle, 28 J. Le-
gal Stud. 393 (1999) (arguing that technological self-help will play a positive role in the 
growth of electronic commerce). 
5 See Lessig, supra note 3, at 233. 
6 See, e.g., Bruce P. Keller, The Game’s the Same: Why Gambling in Cyberspace Violates 
Federal Law, 108 Yale L.J. 1569 (1999) (arguing that Internet gambling should be regulated 
as usual); Edward A. Morse, State Taxation of Internet Commerce: Something New Under 
the Sun?, 30 Creighton L. Rev. 1113 (1997) (arguing that issues of state taxation of Internet-
based commerce are familiar); James B. Speta, Internet Theology, 2 Green Bag 2d 227 
(1999) (arguing that Internet publication does not justify major changes to the First Amend-
ment regime). One could attribute this view to Jack Goldsmith, though in his view, unfairly. 
See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1199, 1201 (1998). 
7 E.g., Lessig, supra note 3; Bell, supra note 4. Nor does the scholarship examining the 
metaphors used for Internet conduct explain compliance patterns. See, e.g., Dan Hunter, Cy-
berspace as Place, and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 90 Cal. L. Rev. (forthcom-
ing 2003) (noting the persistence of the space metaphor); Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Per-
spective in Internet Law, 91 Geo. L.J. (forthcoming 2003) (arguing that technological 
perspectives decide Internet cases); Timothy Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis, 85 
Va. L. Rev. 1163 (1999) (arguing that analysis should focus on application development); 
Alfred C. Yen, Western Frontier or Feudal Society?: Metaphors and Perceptions of Cyber-
space, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1207 (2002) (comparing metaphors of the frontier with cyber-
space). 
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to seek legal advantage. The approach aims to separate two different as-
pects of code’s relatio nship with law. The first is Lessig’s concept of a 
regulatory mechanism: that computer code can substitute for law or 
other forms of regulation. The second aspect is as an anti-regulatory 
mechanism: a tool to minimize the costs of law that certain groups will 
use to their advantage. 
The code designer, I suggest, redesigns behavior for legal advantage. 
The programmer is not unlike the tax lawyer, exploiting differences be-
tween stated goals of the law, and its legal or practical limits. He targets 
specific weaknesses in legal regimes, and has no means to rewrite laws 
in general. Therefore, I argue that the long-term significance of the pro-
grammer’s methods for the legal system can be described in a fairly 
straightforward fashion. At its greatest extent, the design of code may 
provide a new option for influencing specific laws. It will be of the 
greatest importance to individuals or large, disorganized groups poorly 
equipped to take advantage of existing means of political influence. And 
as such, the code option may mean some change in the relative power of 
interest groups, as it makes organization slightly less important.  
The gains to diffuse groups may seem to be a positive development. 
But there is a darker side. Code design, as a means of avoiding laws, 
serves as a particularly useful device for exploiting the internal dynam-
ics of regulated groups. It is, as this Article shows, a useful way for the 
computer-savvy to avoid legal burdens while continuing to enjoy the 
benefits of an ordered society, thanks to the continued compliance of the 
technophobic.  
 In short, increasing use of code to minimize the burden of laws has 
interesting and complicated effects for both the legal system and politi-
cal system that have been misunderstood. The effects are categorically 
different from the fundamental challenge to the legal system that some 
had imagined, and analytically distinct from the concept that code is a 
form of regulation. 
The important case of peer-to-peer (“P2P”) filesharing, explored in 
depth in this Article, illustrates the possibility of using code design as an 
alternative mechanism of interest group behavior. These ingenious pro-
grams, bearing names like “KaZaA” and “BearShare,” make it free and 
easy to trade digital content (usually copyrighted songs) with millions of 
new-found friends. 
P2P filesharing represents the most amibtious effort to undermine an 
existing legal system using computer code. The significance of P2P for 
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copyright is substantial. The efforts of P2P programmers have provided 
computer-savvy music listeners with a continuing reduction in the costs 
of the copyright system, comparable to a temporary repeal of copyright 
laws for computer geeks. P2P underlines the reality of code design as an 
alternative mechanism of interest group behavior. 
But P2P filesharing also makes the limits of this alternative mecha-
nism clear. The efficacy of P2P filesharing depends on two powerful and 
often unrecognized weaknesses of the copyright regime: the law’s de-
pendence on a gatekeeper enforcement mechanism and the severe lack 
of normative support among the regulated. Successful P2P networks 
relegate the law to an exercise in primary enforcement against a multi-
tude of end-users. 
P2P’s success may depend on a unique collective action dynamic 
among music consumers that stems from the nature of copyrighted 
works. The works available on peer networks are generally non-
rivalrous goods.8 As a result, the sub-group of P2P users, young and 
computer-savvy, 9 can take advantage of the continued compliance of 
regular consumers. The mass of regular users pay for the works, thereby 
maintaining incentives for artists to create them, while the P2P sub-
group defects en masse, occupying the game-theorist’s version of utopia. 
These weaknesses, however, represent unique problems for copyright 
law and are not more generalized weaknesses of the legal system. For 
that reason, the utility of P2P as a means of avoiding law appears lim-
ited. Only a few regimes may contain other particularized enforcement 
weaknesses comparable to those of the copyright regime. 
This Article’s claims will rely on a model of compliance and interest 
group behavior with certain novel features. Namely, the focus is on the 
mechanisms through which groups influence law. It is the goal of Part I 
of the Article to make the underlying model clear. 
Laws impose costs upon regulated groups. Those groups that seek to 
minimize the costs of law face a fundamental choice between mecha-
 
8 That is to say, one individual’s consumption does not diminish another user’s value of 
the product. I emphasize this characteristic because some scholars have suggested that songs 
on peer networks display rivalrous features. See Ramayya Krishnan et al., The Economics of 
Peer-To-Peer Networks at 5 (August 2002 draft), available at 
http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~mds/ (on file wit h the Virginia Law Review Association). 
9 According to an Ipsos-Reid study, those who use peer filesharing networks are predomi-
nantly between the ages of twelve and twenty-four. See Robyn Greenspan, Making Money 
on Free Music, at http://www.internetnews.com/stats/article.php/ 
1365161 (last visited May 12, 2003) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). 
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nisms of change and avoidance. Both mechanisms have the effect of 
lowering the expected costs of law, but the similarities end there. 
Mechanisms of change (principally lobbying) decrease the sanction at-
tached to certain conduct and tend to require collective action. Mecha-
nisms of avoidance, on the other hand, decrease the probability of detec-
tion and typically do not require that groups act collectively, but depend 
on specific vulnerabilities in the law. 
This understanding, while not exhaustive, is descriptively useful even 
in the simple form presented. It clarifies the link between problems of 
compliance and group dynamics—the extent of organization of the regu-
lated. It shows that changes in the costs of mechanisms of legal influ-
ence can dramatically affect the function of a given law. 
Part I will conclude by explaining how the design of code can be 
viewed as a mechanism of legal influence. It will argue that code is used 
to reshape behavior to take advantage of loopholes and ambiguities in 
legal systems. As such, code is a mechanism of avoidance, displaying 
the properties of avoidance described in the model.  
Part II will demonstrate the unique vulnerabilities of copyright laws 
and code’s ability to exploit those weaknesses. Copyright enforcement 
has long relied on what Professor Reinier Kraakman first called a gate-
keeper regime. 10 In other words, the copyright regime has achieved its 
goals through enforcement against specialized intermediaries—those ca-
pable of distributing creative works on a mass scale. Peer networks ex-
ploit that enforcement structure by creating a distribution network that 
eliminates intermediaries. While eliminating intermediaries presents a 
serious technical challenge, the goal is clear—to remove the enforce-
ment efficiency of a gatekeeper system, leaving primary enforcement 
against end-users as the only option. 
P2P networks also exploit an important ambiguity regarding the eth-
ics of home copying. Compliance with laws pertaining to the theft of 
real property is  facilitated in part by the status of clearly established 
norms. These norms help prevent certain forms of economic injury to 
copyright owners, like the stealing of books or CDs from stores. Studies 
show that people are generally untroubled by the non-commercial home 
copying of copyrighted content.11 P2P applications are designed to look 
 
10 Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-party Enforcement Strat-
egy, 2 J. L. Econ. & Org. 53, 53–54 (1986). 
11 See Amanda Lenhart et al., The Pew Internet & Am. Life Project, Downloading Free 
Music: Internet music lovers don’t think it’s stealing 5 (Sept. 28, 2000), available at 
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and feel more like non-commercial home copying than like breaking 
into a record store. The design therefore successfully exploits the norma-
tive distinction between illegal “stealing” and innocuous “copying.”12 
Part III will demonstrate how P2P protocols have grown, through 
several iterations, to specialize in exploiting copyright’s gatekeeper sys-
tem. By its end, the P2P story suggests real limits on network design’s 
ability to influence law. Influencing the law in such a manner requires, 
particular vulnerabilities in the law and a group that lacks better options. 
The limits in generalizing the P2P model to other areas of law demon-
strate why the compliance challenge is specific to certain classes of vul-
nerable laws, not a general challenge to the legal system. 
Part IV will conclude by studying the fit between P2P applic ations 
and music consumers as an interest group. A fascinating aspect of the 
peer filesharing story is the lack of coordination and organization that 
characterized its development. Developers bicker and work independ-
ently, and etiquette among users must be engineered or, as Professor 
Lior Strahilevitz argues, induced with “charismatic code.”13 Despite the 
chaos, peer networks have managed to provide a subset of music listen-
ers with a continuing reduction in the costs of copyright laws. 
Such results from disorganized efforts are consistent with the distinc-
tion between mechanisms of avoidance and of change. The disorganiza-
tion supports the claim that matters as an option for groups whose inabil-
ity to act collectively precludes better options. 
Finally, the results may also reflect the current ability of P2P users to 
take advantage of the continued compliance of the majority of the popu-
lation. The copyright regime’s subjects are divided by a technological 
line between the computer-savvy and regular users. Because consump-
tion of copyrighted works is non-rivalrous, P2P users may rely on regu-
lar users to pay for music and to provide incentives for its creation, free-
riding on the results. 
 
http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/toc.asp?Report=23 (on file with the Virginia Law Re-
view Association); Office of Tech. Assessment, U.S. Cong., Copyright and Home Copying: 
Technology Challenges the Law 163 (Oct. 1989), at 
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~ota/disk1/1989/8910_n.html (on file with the Virginia Law 
Review Association). 
12 Cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms and the Emergence of Co-
operation on the File -Swapping Networks, 89 Va. L. Rev. 505 (2003) (arguing that charis-
matic code creates an illusion of reciprocity that accounts for why pe ople contribute to a 
filesharing network). 
13 See generally, id. 
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Analyzing code design as a mechanism of interest group behavior 
yields a nuanced picture. It departs from the grandiose predictions that 
dominate discussion in this area. As with the onset of lobbying, impact 
litigation, or sophisticated tax evasion, the rise of copyright evasion is 
best understood as a change in power dynamics among and within regu-
lated groups. 
I. A THEORY OF CODE, CHANGE, AND AVOIDANCE 
The design of anti-regulatory code is best analyzed as one of many 
mechanisms that interest groups might use to influence the effects of 
law. Implicit in this argument is a set of assumptions and arguments that 
Part I seeks to clarify. 
A. Reactions to Law in General Theories of Regulation 
John Austin, lecturing on jurisprudence in the early 1800s, sought to 
separate law, the “appropriate matter of jurisprudence,” from morals, re-
ligious scruples, and other distractions.14 Two hundred years later, posi-
tive legal scholarship has come full circle. Rather than focusing on sepa-
rating law from norms or ethics, it has pushed instead toward 
understanding law as part of more general theories of regulation. 15 Led 
by the law and society movement and Robert Ellickson’s book, Order 
Without Law, theorists routinely study the regulatory effects of law, 
group rules, social norms, and even the regulatory potential of code.16 
Such scholarship reflects an effort to understand all the “forces” of regu-
lation that might be acting on an individual, reasoning that understand-
ing the study of law alone gives an incomplete picture. Robert Ellickson 
even gave the study of law in isolation a pejorative label: “legal cen-
tralis[m].”17 
 
14 See John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 26 (1832). 
15 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 
126–32 (1991) (describing five different sources of regulation); Lessig, supra note 3, at 86–
90 (describing four modalities of regulation: law, markets, norms, and architecture (code)). 
The antecedents for such general theories are in related sociological efforts. See, e.g., Donald 
Black, Toward a General Theory of Social Control xi (Donald Black ed., 1984) (collecting 
articles). A survey of legal scholarship in this vein can be found in Lawrence Lessig, The 
New Chicago School, 27 J. Legal Stud. 661 (1998). 
16 Lessig, supra note 3, at 86–90. 
17 Ellickson, supra note 15, at 4, 137–47. Oliver Williamson coined the phrase, see Oliver 
E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 83 Am. Econ. 
Rev. 519, 520 (1983), although Ellickson popularized and expanded on the criticism. 
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Based on this work, the Internet law writers of the 1990s added the 
idea that the design of computer code could be understood as an alterna-
tive means of regulation, leading to the catchphrase “Code is Law.”18 
The idea is that programmers make choices that constrain online capa-
bility, and that such choices are regulatory in their effects. Lawrence 
Lessig, for example, argued that the size and weight of office buildings 
can be understood as a mechanism for preventing their theft, just like a 
law against larceny. 19 Similarly, he reasoned, code-based copyright pro-
tection for programs that make software difficult to steal are a form of 
regulation.20 The same goes for code-based content-filters that might it 
make it easier, or harder, to reach an intended audience. The design of 
filters is simply the code-based regulation of speech.21 
 But as the scope of regulatory scholarship increases, it becomes more 
apparent that there is something lopsided to the effort. Current scholar-
ship pays great attention to the range of options available to regulators. 
But how much attention is paid to the reactions of the regulated? The 
spirit of positive scholarship is to leave no stone unturned in the assess-
ment of regulatory effect. Fidelity to that approach necessitates under-
standing not only regulation options, but also how the regulated might 
undermine or compromise a regulatory scheme. If the goal of positive 
scholarship is to understand the net effect of the regulatory forces acting 
on a body, the model is incomplete without incorporating the reaction to 
those forces. But what form will such reactions take? And how effective 
will they be? 
Today, such questions are answered in different ways by different 
bodies of scholarship. In general, one answer comes from the compli-
ance literature: Groups will avoid laws they find burdensome. Another 
answer comes from writings in political choice: groups will act to 
change disagreeable laws. This Part proposes to reconcile and unite 
these divergent accounts of the behavior of the regulated by analyzing 
the choice between avoidance and change. 
 
 
18 See generally, Lessig, supra note 3. 
19 Lessig, supra note 3, at 86–90. 
20 Id. 
21 See generally, Lawrence Lessig, What Things Regulate Speech: CDA 2.0 vs. Filtering, 
38 Jurimetrics J. 629 (1998). 
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B. When Groups Get Sick of Complying 
What choices face an individual or group that decides to quit comply-
ing with the law and to invest in some mechanism to change its effects? 
This Section outlines the fundamental choice between efforts to change 
and efforts to avoid laws. 
First, a few assumptions should be made clear. Laws and other regu-
lations prevent groups from doing what they would otherwise want to 
do. As Professor Tom Tyler puts it, “Laws are passed and enforced to 
mandate behavior that people would prefer to avoid  . . . . It is a basic 
tenet of polit ical theory that any society . . . fails to provide its citizens 
with some thing they want and feel they deserve.”22 A related assump-
tion is that the initial content of laws are exogenous, the result of an un-
specified political process.23 As a result, groups often face laws with 
which they disagree and would prefer to not follow, either in individual 
cases or as a general matter. In this model, compliance is driven by ex-
pected costs (punishments) deriving from legal sanctions (other sources 
are possible, but omitted for the present). 24 Finally, a mechanism of legal 
influence is anything that, for a given price, buys a decrease in the ex-
pected punishment associated with violating a given law. 
1. Avoidance Mechanisms 
When and why do groups obey the law? Basic economic models of 
compliance give a very simple answer: Laws are followed when the ex-
pected costs of legal punishment exceed the expected benefits of the 
banned behavior. 25 The result is commendably simple, but, as theorists 
point out, only because it does not accurately describe when subjects 
obey the law. Two important sets of contributing factors are neglected. 
The first is extra-legal forces, such as social norms, that might contribute 
 
22 Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 19–20 (1990). 
23 The assumption that the content of laws is exogenous becomes difficult to maintain 
when we consider changing laws as a mechanism of response. In a subsequent section, I 
consider what happens when the assumption that laws are exogenous is relaxed. See infra 
text accompanying notes 72–78. 
24 Cf. Leo Katz, Ill-Gotten Gains: Evasion, Blackmail, Fraud and Kindred Puzzles of The 
Law 17–30 (1996) (describing avoision of moral and ethical rules as comparable to avoision 
of law). The concept of avoision is described more fully infra note 32. 
25 Albeit with much built into each side of the equation. See, e.g., Richard Posner, Eco-
nomic Analysis of Law 242 (5th ed. 1998) (“The model can be very simple: A person com-
mits a crime because the expected benefits of the crime to him exceed the expected costs.”). 
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to compliance. The second is investments in mechanisms of avoidance, 
or efforts that would lower the expected costs of the law, which might 
lead to greater non-compliance. 
Efforts to broaden the basic model have focused on the first point, fo-
cusing on the role that social norms and other factors play in creating 
compliance. Both theory and some empirical studies suggest that the 
threat of legal punishments alone cannot and does not fully explain why 
people obey or do not obey the law.26 Supplemental explanations tend to 
rely either on normative theories or more advanced models of self-
interested behavior. Some, like Professor Tyler, argue that normative 
considerations are central to understanding the public’s decision whether 
to comply or not. 27 Others, like Professor Eric Posner, model extra-legal 
compliance as self-interested signaling.28 Still others have modeled it as 
a part of self-interested models of group interaction following game-
theoretic models.29 
This Section, however, focuses on a different criticism of the basic 
economic model of compliance—that it fails to take into account in-
vestments in efforts to avoid the law. As much as the regulative effect of 
 
26 See, e.g., Tyler, supra note 22, at 22 (“[T]he legal system cannot function if it can influ-
ence people only by manipulating rewards and costs.”); Ellickson, supra note 15, at 137–47 
(arguing that law’s punishments only explain some of the social order we see); Eric A. Pos-
ner, Law and Social Norms: The Case Of Tax Compliance, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1781, 1782 
(2000) (observing that state punishment cannot explain tax compliance); Paul G. Mahoney & 
Chris William Sanchirico, Norms, Repeated Games, and the Role of Law 41–48 (2002) (un-
published manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?  
abstract_id=311879 (suggesting that state punishment of deviants supports social orders oth-
erwise maintained by group sanctions). With mixed answers, some of the empirical studies 
of the relationship between legal threats and compliance include Isaac Ehrlich, Crime, Pun-
ishment, and the Market for Offenses, 10 J. Econ. Persp. 43 (1996) (surveying empirical 
work in this area); Daniel S. Nagin & Raymond Paternoster, The Preventive Effects of the 
Perceived Risk of Arrest: Testing and Expanded Conception of Deterrence, 29 Criminology 
561, 580–81 (1991) (arguing that certainty of punishment plays a clear but minor role in de-
terming compliance); Raymond Paternoster, The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Certainty and 
Severity of Punishment: A Review of the Evidence and Issues, 4 Just. Q. 173 (1987) (sug-
gesting weak correlation between perceived certainty of detection and drug use). 
27 See E. Allan Lind & Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice 230–31 
(1988) (developing a group value model to explain compliance); see generally, Tyler, supra 
note 22 (arguing that perception of legitimacy affects the decision to comply). 
28 Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms 88–111 (2000). Posner points out that the norma-
tive and self-interested models of compliance can be unified by recognizing that effective 
signaling depends on laws being considered legitimate. See id. at 111. 
29 See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 15, at 137–47 (presenting a model premised on iterated 
prisoner’s dilemma); Mahoney & Sanchirico, supra note 26 (same). 
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social norms may create more compliance than the basic model predicts, 
investments in efforts to decrease or eliminate punishments may result in 
less compliance than predicted. In their classic article, Law Enforcement, 
Malfeasance and Compensation of Enforcers, Professors Gary Becker 
and George Stigler first argued that investments in avoidance should be 
considerations of compliance.30 They added investments in bribery or 
intimidation to a model of criminal behavior, pointing out that if a per-
son had already violated the law, she would be willing to invest up to the 
costs of the sanction to avoid punishment. 31 This insight suggests a very 
basic point: compliance is not simply a function of punishments, but 
also of the cost of mechanisms to avoid punis hment.32 
The compliance literature surrounding particular statutory regimes 
gives more particularized insight into how groups avoid laws. Avoid-
ance of laws is a particular focus of writings on tax compliance, 33 and is 
also the subject of study in labor law,34 criminal law,35 environmental 
law,36 and international law. 37 From these areas, a pattern emerges, indi-
 
30 See Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance and Compen-
sation of Enforcers, 3 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1974). 
31 Id. at 2–6. The observation was a short stop enroute to their proposal for private en-
forcement of criminal law, and the debate over their paper has focused on the merits of pr i-
vate and public law enforcement. See, e.g., Mark A. Cohen & Paul H. Rubin, Private En-
forcement of Public Policy, 3 Yale J. on Reg. 167 (1985) (arguing for shifting responsibility 
for implementing and enforcing public policy to private enforcement agents); William M. 
Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1975) 
(responding to Becker and Stigler’s proposal to privatize criminal law enforcement). 
32 This insight is described in greater depth at infra text accompanying notes 66–70. 
33 See, e.g., Marsha Blumenthal et al., Do Normative Appeals Affect Tax Compliance? 
Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 54 Nat’l Tax J. 125 (2001) (conclu d-
ing from a tax compliance study that normatively appealing to a taxpayer’s conscience via a 
letter had an insignificant overall impact on tax compliance); Michael J. Graetz et al., The 
Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement, 2 J.L. Econ. & 
Org. 1 (1986) (modeling tax compliance as a game); Posner, supra note 26, at 1782 (propos-
ing a signaling model rather than the standard state sanctioning model to explain tax compli-
ance); David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 860, 884 (1999) 
(arguing that anti-abuse standards would be more efficient than rules aimed at curbing tax 
avoidance). 
34 See Ronald Turner, Reactions of the Regulated: A Federal Labor Law Example, 17 Lab. 
Law. 479 (2002) (detailing ways in which groups practice “avoision” of labor laws). 
35 See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2385, 2414–15 
(1997) (noting that a deterrence model in criminal law should focus on the role of substitute 
products and complements to banned products and behavior). 
36 See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, When Should We Prefer Tort Law to Environmental Regula-
tion?, 41 Washburn L.J. 515 (2002) (comparing the benefits of using tort law as a system of 
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cating that there are two fundamentally different ways to avoid a law’s 
sanctions. The first can be termed evasion. Evasion can be defined as an 
investment in decreasing the odds of being punished for violating a law. 
Wearing a mask to rob a bank, buying a radar detector, hiring expensive 
defense lawyers, and bribing police officers are all examples.38 Each, for 
a certain price, decreases the odds of being punished after the law is dis-
obeyed. 
There exists a second, less obvious way to avoid legal punis hment. 
This is what Professor Leo Katz calls “avoision,” which can be defined 
as efforts to exploit the differences between a law’s goals and its self de-
fined limits. As Professor Ronald Turner describes it, avoision repre-
sents “efforts to change legal mandates or the avoidance of laws in ways 
that evade the law’s intent or purpose but do not actually constitute 
unlawful behavior.”39 Consider the example of the pornographer who, 
worried about running afoul of decency laws, puts his photos in a book 
along with incisive essays on “sex in marriage.” Or consider the tax-
payer who, blocked from deducting a transfer of money to her son, de-
vises a complicated loan scheme to achieve the same effect. Professor 
Leo Katz’s book on avoision is full of such examples from law and other 
aspects of life.40 One may identify a similar dynamic in Professor Neal 
Katyal’s study of the role of substitute products in criminal deterrence. 41 
If, for example, the goal of the drug laws is to prevent addiction and 
abuse, a person who opts to become an alcoholic (legal) instead of a 
crack addict (illegal) is practicing avoision. 
These writings paint the following picture: Groups, to minimize the 
burdens of laws, will sometimes invest in avoidance. If the price is right 
 
privately enforced environmental protection to traditional public statute-based regulatory 
schemes). 
37 Compliance in international law is studied in the absence of a centralized enforcement 
system, creating concerns more akin to the study of compliance with social norms. See, e.g., 
Abram Chayes & Antonia Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International 
Regulatory Agreements (1995) (studying compliance with treaties); Jack L. Goldsmith & 
Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1113 (1999) 
(studying compliance with customary international law). 
38 Some of these are ex post examples, others are ex ante. For present purposes they are 
considered together. 
39 See Turner, supra note 34, at 479. 
40 See generally, Katz, supra note 24 (presenting examples of avoision). 
41 See generally, Katyal, supra note 35 (studying role of substitute products in models of 
criminal deterrence). 
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(more on this later), 42 they will invest in mechanisms to lower or elimi-
nate the probability of being punished for disregarding a law. Groups 
may either decrease the probability of detection (as in Becker’s example 
of a bribe) or adopt other forms of conduct with the same effects (as in 
Katyal’s substitution effect, or Katz’s avoision). 
This might seem to deliver a full picture of how groups react to laws. 
But even at this level of generality, writings on compliance still deliver a 
limited picture of how individuals or groups might try to defeat a regula-
tory scheme. For, as the political choice literature teaches, groups also 
react to burdensome laws with efforts to change the law. The next sec-
tion considers change mechanisms as an alternative. 
2. Change Mechanisms 
In the early 1990s, the dietary supplement industry faced a serious le-
gal threat. Following several well-publicized deaths, the Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) proposed to regulate popular dietary supple-
ments like other drugs, requiring proof of therapeutic value and carefully 
determined dosages.43 The reaction of the supplement industry was to 
invest in an expensive but successful lobbying campaign to change the 
law. Within a short time, Congress had passed legislation limiting the 
FDA’s authority to regulate these products.44 It is by now a familiar in-
sight from public choice theory that groups that find a law disagreeable 
may try to change it. 45 In the 1970s, a series of articles written by 
economists George J. Stigler and Sam Peltzman, 46 followed by Robert E. 
McCormick and Robert D. Tollison’s book, Politicians, Legislation, and 
the Economy,47 first modeled legislation as wealth transfers that interest 
groups purchased with money and votes. As Peltzman put the basic 
 
42 The effect of prices of mechanisms is discussed in infra text accompanying notes 66–70. 
43 See Regulation of Dietary Supplements, 58 Fed. Reg. 33,690 (proposed June 18, 1993). 
44 See Die tary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 
Stat. 4325, 4326 (1994). This Act amended the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
(“FDCA”) classifying dietary supplements as a new category of food, thereby preventing the 
FDA from regulating supplements as drugs or food additives. 
45 For a summary of work in this area, see Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II (1989), 
particularly chapters 13 and 16. 
46 See Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & Econ. 211 
(1976); George J. Stigler, The Size of Legislatures, 5 J. Legal Stud. 17 (1976); George J. 
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. of Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3 (1971) (pre-
senting a general interest group theory of politics). 
47 Robert E. McCormick & Robert D. Tollison, Politicians, Legislation and the Economy 
(1981). 
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premise: “I begin with the presumption that what is basically at stake in 
regulatory processes is a transfer of wealth . . . . [B]eneficiaries [of 
wealth transfers] pay with both votes and dollars.”48 Or, as Professors 
Richard Posner and William Landes described the legislative process, 
laws are sold for “campaign contributions, votes, implicit promises of 
future favors, and sometimes outright bribes.”49 
The basic model treats legislative change as a commodity available 
for purchase. Since the introduction of the model, the literature studying 
the specific mechanics of interest groups and lawmaking has become 
more sophisticated. Professor Fred McChesney, for example, proposes 
that law-makers are more extortionists than bribees.50 He highlights lob-
bying’s defensive aspects (Congress threatening legislation that groups 
pay to avoid), and concludes that much of the political process can be 
better described as rent-extraction instead of rent-creation. 51 A series of 
papers in the economics literature, meanwhile, tries to improve on the 
simple bribery model with information theory, asserting that lobbying 
works through the selective presentation of information.52 Despite these 
refinements, however, lobbying continues to be studied as a change 
mechanism—a tool that delivers or prevents legal change for a price. 
The process of achieving legal change through litigation has also, 
though less often, been studied as an investment model. In Professors 
Landes’s and Posner’s first analysis of the independent judiciary, litiga-
tion served as a means of extending the value of the legislative bargains 
made between interest groups and the legislators.53 Professor Jeremy 
Rabkin, in a 1989 work, broadly argued that, through their litigation 
 
48 Peltzman, supra note 46, at 213–14. 
49 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & Econ. 875, 877 (1975). 
50 See Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of 
Regulation, 16 J. Legal Stud. 101 (1987) [hereinafter McChesney, Rent Extraction]; see also 
Fred S. McChesney, Money for Nothing (1997) (developing and broadening the rent extrac-
tion model) [hereinafter McChesney, Money for Nothing]. 
51 McChesney, Rent Extraction, supra note 50, at 109–12. 
52 See, e.g., David Austen-Smith & John R. Wright, Competitive lobbying for a legisla-
tors’ vote, 9 Soc. Choice & Welfare 229 (1992) (developing a model of interest group be-
havior based on the notion that such lobbying is the exercise of strategic information trans-
mission); Johan Lagerlof, Lobbying, information and private and social welfare, 13 Eur. J. 
Pol. Econ. 615 (1997) (same); Susanne Lohmann, Information, access, and contributions: A 
signaling model of lobbying, 85 Pub. Choice 267 (1995) (same). 
53 See Landes & Posner, supra note 49; Posner, supra note 25, at 587–90. 
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strategies, interest groups determine or radically influence the regulatory 
agendas of agencies.54 
In a 1991 essay Einer Elhauge argued that the litigation process was 
equally, if not more, susceptible to interest group influence. 55 He argued 
that, generally speaking, “the same interest groups that have an organ-
izational advantage in collecting resources to influence legislators and 
agencies also have an organizational advantage in collecting resources to 
influence the courts.”56 Therefore, “[I]ncreasing the lawmaking power of 
the courts may only exacerbate the influence of interest groups.”57 
Whether Elhauge’s specific conclusion is right or wrong, he demon-
strates that litigation campaigns can also be interpreted as investments in 
legal change. 
This literature shows that mechanisms of change can be viewed as an 
alternative to mechanisms of evasion for lowering the costs of law. 
3. Summary: The Change/Avoidance Choice 
This Part has suggested that groups and individuals face a choice be-
tween avoidance and change mechanisms when deciding how to react to 
burdensome laws. Very simply, if a law is a cost on its subject, then 
avoidance and change mechanisms, the subjects of the compliance and 
political choice literatures respectively, can be pictured as different di-














54 Jeremy Rabkin, Judicial Compulsions: How Public Law Distorts Public Policy (1989). 
55 See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Instrusive Judicial Re-
view?, 101 Yale L.J. 31 (1991). 
56 Id. at 67–68. 
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As identified in the discussion above, within each broader category of 
mechanism, are specific subcategories, such as lobbying or litigation in 
the case of change mechanisms, and evasion and avoision in the case of 
avoidance mechanisms. Finally, while the model here focuses on law as 
the regulatory modality, the basic framework of analysis is meant for 
any source of regulation. 
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58 Some people may feel discomfort at comparing change and avoidance in this fashion, 
but this discomfort may be useful and instructive. One can draw a parallel to Albert Hirsch-
man’s work on institutional feedback. See Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Albert Hirschman 
(1970). Hirschman emphasized that members of declining institutions faced a fundamental 
choice between “voice” and “exit” as forms of feedback. Despite the different “feel” of voice 
and exit—study by different fields of scholarship, and the sense of disloyalty evident in the 
latter—Hirschman maintained that a useful picture of organizational feedback required un-
derstanding the choice. This Part suggests that focusing on the choice between avoidance 
and change for groups faced with burdensome laws will yield similar dividends. As with 
voice and exit, we want to know the conditions under which each option will prevail, and 
each strategy’s comparative efficiency. And if tools of avoida nce are growing in sophistic a-
tion, as the example of code design here studied suggests, it makes sense to understand what 
the consequences will be. 
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Nature of Good 
 
Collective Good Excludable Good 
 
C. Group Dynamics, Collective Action 
The distinction between a group’s choice of a change or avoidance 
strategy is fundamental to understanding how groups deal with laws they 
do not like. This Section links that choice to questions of group dynam-
ics and problems of collective action. 
In 1964, Professor Mancur Olson made a well-known contribution to 
the study of interest group behavior. 59 Using the logic of collective ac-
tion, he divided those affected by regulation into two main groups—
those capable of effective polit ical action, and the “forgotten groups” 
who, he argued, “suffer in silence.”60 The dividing line lay in the ability 
to overcome collective action problems. Olson asserted that effective po-
litical action would generally represent a problem of collective action, 
making small groups and those organized for some other purpose (like 
unions) effective political actors and rendering large and disorganized 
groups essentially victims of the legislative process.61 His model pre-
dicted that lobbies representing business, labor, agriculture, and profes-
sionals would enjoy a perpetual advantage, leaving consumers and other 
latent groups forgotten and even oppressed.62 
The change/avoidance dichotomy suggests a different conclusion. 
Forgotten groups do not necessarily suffer in silence; instead, they avoid  
laws with which they disagree, so long as doing so is convenient. In the 
terms used here, the groups Olson identified as incapable of collective 
action will generally lack the capacity to invest in change mechanisms. 
But that does not necessarily make them inert when faced with burden-
some laws. Rather, their recourse is limited to investing in avoidance 
mechanisms to decrease the costs of laws. One may better understand 
 
59 See Mancur Olson Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (1965). The logic of colle ctive 
action and the problem of free-riding now underlie most present-day studies of lobbying and 
interest group behavior. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public 
Choice: A Critical Introduction 17–21 (1991); McCormick & Tollison, supra note 47, at 17–
18 (discussing organizing costs); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical Reexamination of the Tak-
ings Jurisprudence, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1892, 1949–52 (1992) (summarizing the lobbying ad-
vantages available to a small interest group). 
60 Olson, supra note 59, at 165. 
61 Id. at 53–57, 132–34, 165–67. 
62 Id. at 133–67. 
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Olson’s dichotomy between groups as an indication of who can take ad-
vantage of change mechanisms. 
This follows because change presents a collective action problem, 
while avoidance does not. Changes in laws display the classic attributes 
of public goods. The repeal of the prohibition on alcohol in the Eight-
eenth Amendment, 63 for example, benefited all drinkers, not just those 
who contributed to the effort to repeal it. 64 Nor was there any possibility 
that the repeal would be consumed or dissipated by overuse. As a result, 
economic theory predicts a free-riding or collective action problem: The 
beneficiaries of the change will wait for others to invest in it and will 
subsequently free-ride on those efforts. 
None of this is true of avoidance mechanisms. When a thief wears a 
mask to rob a bank, he is the sole and direct beneficiary of his invest-
ment.  The driver using a radar detector keeps the benefits for herself. 
When a firm invests in a complicated tax avoidance scheme, its competi-
tors do not benefit. In other words, investments in avoidance mecha-
nisms create excludable, rivalrous goods. In general, avoidance mecha-
nisms will side-step the problems of collective action inherent in change 
mechanisms.65  
 
63 See U.S. Const. Amend. XXI, § 1. 
64 The repeal also cannot be “used up” by overconsumption. Legal change is an example 
of what economists call a public or collective good: It is both non-rival and non-excludable. 
See Olson, supra note 57, at 14 (defining public good). 
65 A clever observer might object that this collective/private good distinction seems to blur 
on further inspection. Yes, a tax avoidance scheme delivers benefits for the schemer, but if 
successful, it may serve as a useful model for others. A police officer, once bribed, might be 
easier to bribe in the future. The cars behind the driver with the radar detector might guess 
why she brakes suddenly. So does avoidance really present a different kind of collective ac-
tion problem than investments in change? 
 It does, I suggest, because all of the examples posited simply represent the consumption of 
a private good that creates a positive externality. This distinction can be illustrated by the 
“popcorn/incense” example. Consider that cooking and eating popcorn will create a delicious 
fragrance from which others cannot be excluded. That fact does not make the popcorn itself 
a public good. The buyer of the popcorn reaps the reward of her investment, while also con-
ferring a benefit on her peers. Hence, diffuse unorganized groups should be expected to eat 
popcorn despite the collective benefit conferred.  
 Replace popcorn with bribing a police officer and the same results are obtained. The briber 
personally reaps the benefits of the bribe in an fashion excludable and riva lrous, but she also 
confers a benefit on all future bribers. 
 Conversely, in the domain of public fragrance, the appropriate parallel to a change mecha-
nism like lobbying is the burning of incense. It costs money to burn incense so as to produce 
a pleasant fragrance for the benefit of all. Hence, unlike popcorn, only organized groups will 
burn incense, just as only organized groups will invest in lobbying campaigns.  
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As a consequence it behooves third parties to sell avoidance to diffuse 
groups. A third party can invent a mechanism for reducing the costs of a 
given law, and then sell it to members of a diffuse group for profit or 
fame. This is what happens when drivers buy radar detectors, companies 
hire tax lawyers, or when music listeners download file-sharing soft-
ware. A legal entrepreneur invests in creating a means of lowering the 
costs of law, and then sells it to groups that would otherwise comply.  
A final complication with respect to avoidance and internal group dy-
namics is worth stating. This Part, for simplicity’s sake, has modeled all 
laws simply as a cost to a regulated group, from which they derive no 
benefit. But many laws provide both benefits and costs, and this fact 
makes a difference for understanding the attraction of avoidance mecha-
nisms. Avoidance mechanisms can be used to lower the cost of a given 
legal regime, while continuing to enjoy the benefits, through the rational 
exploitation of the compliance of the rest of the regulated group. The 
successful bank robber wants to steal money, but also wants to benefit 
from a healthy financial system. Tax dodgers want to avoid paying taxes 
while ideally enjoying public services paid for by everyone else. And, as 
the P2P filesharing case study explores in greater depth, getting music 
for free probably works best when most of the population continues to 
pay retail.  
D. Deciding to Quit 
Groups do not spend all their time avoiding laws or trying to change 
them; most people comply with most laws most of the time. When do 
individuals or groups decide to quit obeying the law and instead invest 
in some way to way to avoid or change it? The basic deterrence model 
discussed above suggests that this happens when the cost of compliance 
exceeds the expected cost of punishment. Theorists supplement that 
model by accounting for compliance stemming from costs associated 
with social norms and other sources. One may derive a more complete 
answer by introducing the option of investing in mechanisms to decrease 
legal66 or other costs. The following discussion will show two things. 
First, compliance can be understood to depend less on punishment than 
on the cost of mechanisms of change or avoidance. Second, this discus-
 
66 A caveat is necessary. At this stage, the model that follows is admittedly legally-centrist. 
For simplicity’s sake, it does not include the compliance produced by norms or other modali-
ties of regulation. 
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sion will demonstrate the effect of a group’s ability to act collectively, 
pooling resources to invest in legal change. 
First, examine a basic case where groups obey the law when expected 
costs of disobedience exceed expected benefits and where there are no 
mechanisms to influence the law. If a traffic law mandates a fifty-five 
mile-per-hour speed limit, the expected benefit of ignoring the law and 
driving eighty miles-per-hour might be $50, while the expected cost will 
be the price of the speeding ticket multiplied by the chance of getting 
caught (say, 20% x $500 = $100). With these parameters the driver will 










Now, allow for the option of investing in a mechanism that influences 
the expected costs of the law. As discussed above, Becker and Stigler’s 
original example was the bribe; for a certain fee, a bribe reduces the ex-
pected costs of a law to zero (by eliminating any chance of detection). 67 
There are, however, a wide variety of mechanisms beyond bribes that 
will accomplish the same effect. For the driver, there exists a strategy of 
avoidance and one of change: investing in a radar detector and lobbying 
to repeal the speeding law, respectively. 
Individuals and groups will invest in a mechanism of legal influence 
when it becomes cheaper to do so than to simply comply with the law. 
Entities will invest in such mechanisms when the expected benefits ex-
ceed the sum of the response strategy cost and the expected costs of non-
compliance (as reduced through the mechanism). 
One may describe this dynamic with a very simple equation. Groups 
that have the option of purchasing mechanisms of legal influence will do 
so when: 
 
Expected Benefits > (Expected Costs – Mechanism Effect) + 
 
67 Becker & Stigler, supra note 30, at 5–6. 
Compliance With No Investments in Response 
 
Assume:  
(1) Speed limit = 55 mph 
(2) Benefit of driving 80 mph = $50 
(3) Expected Costs = (Sanction)*(Probability of Detection) = $500*0.2 = 
$100 
 
Result: Driver complies with law, because expected costs > expected 
benefits 
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Cost of Mechanism 
 
Apply this framework to two of the preceding examples: radar detec-
tors and lobbying. First, consider a $40 radar detector that eliminates 
any chance of being caught speeding. For the driver discussed above, 
this is a worthwhile investment. For the price of the radar detector ($40), 
he gets to drive at eighty miles-per-hour (benefit $50) and is therefore 
$10 ahead. The driver is pleased, but the regulator is not; the law that 







This example demonstrates that if the mechanism of legal influence is 
100% effective, like our radar detector, the expected cost of legal sanc-
tions is reduced to zero, and thus can be eliminated from the basic in-
vestment equation. Therefore, given perfectly effective mechanisms, the 
only relevant inputs are the expected benefits and the cost of the re-
sponse strategy, and the equation can be simplified as follows: 
Investment when: 
 
Expected Benefit > Cost of Mechanism 
 
In other words, in a world where avoidance or change is entirely ef-
fective, compliance with current law has little to do with punis hment, 
but is instead a direct function of how much it costs to buy a way out. 
Consider a few implications of this analysis. The first example in-
volves an avoidance strategy. If the speed limit were one hundred miles-
per-hour, and hence not much of a burden, few individuals would buy 
the perfect $40 radar detector. Conversely, if the speed limit were low-
ered to ten miles-per-hour, an onerous burden, everyone would want a 
 
68 Notice that for simplicity’s sake, this hypothetical has neglected the government’s re-
sponse: government can, as some states do, ban the radar detector (but more on this later). 
 
Assume: 
(4) Probability of detection = 0% 
(5) Expected benefit of speeding = $50 
(6) Expected cost of radar detector = $40 
(7) Expected cost of legal punishment = $500 x 0 = 0 
$50 > 0 + $40 
 
Result: Driver disregards law  
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perfect radar detector, even if it cost $500. Finally, notice that if the 
price of the perfect radar detector suddenly falls to $1, it may become a 
worthwhile investment, even for the nearly costless one hundred mile-
per-hour speed limit. 69 
The second example involves a lobbying campaign. Assume it would 
cost $100,000 to organize a campaign to repeal the speeding laws. For 
the individual driver, the lobbying campaign is not a worthwhile pur-
chase. The benefit of driving at eighty miles-per-hour is only $50. The 
cost of the campaign would leave the driver $99,950 in the red, unless 
he were somehow able to charge his fellow drivers for the successful re-
peal, an unlikely prospect. 
 
 
Would it make sense for the affected group (all drivers) to invest in a 
campaign to repeal the speeding laws? Assume that there are 100,000 
drivers in the lawmaking jurisdiction (a state). If the drivers organize 
themselves so as to divide the costs of the repeal campaign, they pay $1 
each, and such an arrangement is clearly a good deal for all involved. 
Stated otherwise, the cost of compliance for the group is $50 times 
 
69 The benefits of not having to comply with the law must be greater than the cost of a re-
sponse strategy for any investment to happen at all. This necessity is a consequence of per-
spective; the assumption is that the individual is complying with the law, and deciding 
whether to invest in some way to make it worthwhile not to comply. In contrast, Becker and 
Stigler’s or iginal model posited a criminal already in violation of the law, and suggested that 
“[t]he violator would be willing to bribe as much as [the fine] to ignore the evidence.” 
Becker & Stigler, supra note 30, at 5. While the behavior of violators is of interest, it gener-
ally seems more interesting to understand what individuals already regulated by the law will 
do, instead of assuming that they will break it. 
Compliance Given a $100,000 Lobbying Campaign 
Assume: 
 
(8) Repeal makes expected costs = $0 
(9) Expected benefit of speeding = $50 
(10) Expected cost of campaign = $100,000 
 
$50 < $100,000 
 
Result: Driver complies with law. 
Compliance Given a $100,000 Lobbying Campaign (2) 
Assume: 
 
(11) Repeal makes expected costs = $0 
(12) Group expected benefit of speeding = $5 million 
(13) Expected c st of c mpaign = $100,000 
 
$5,000,000 > $100,000 
 
Result: Group repeals speeding laws. 
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100,000 drivers, or $5 million. The lobbying campaign is, therefore, a 
bargain. 
 
If these numbers are even close to realistic, then why are there traffic 
laws or any other laws that large groups find disagreeable? As already 
demonstrated and as basic political choice theory teaches, the answer is 
that groups such as drivers are not organized and have no effective 
mechanism to divide the costs of a campaign to change the law. 70 This 
demonstrates the conclusion urged above: Groups incapable of collec-
tive action tend toward avoidance mechanisms, while the organized in-
vest in mechanisms of change. 
E. Avoidance, Change, and Regulatory Competition 
This Article has until now focused on first-generation reactions—
those of an interest group to a disagreeable law. This Section adds “reac-
tions to the reaction” to show how regulatory competition between two 
opposing groups develops, with each investing in efforts to influence the 
law in its favor. For this analysis, the model of rent-seeking competi-
tions is a useful descriptive, though not necessarily normative, guide. 
The model has thus far treated laws exclusively as exogenously im-
posed costs on regulated groups. A more realistic model recognizes that 
the content of laws is a function of group interests, so that for every 
regulated group there exists a beneficiary group.71 For example, if a law 
bans noisy sound trucks then the law regulates advertisers in the interest 
of town residents.72 Successful efforts to avoid or change the law may, 
therefore, inspire the beneficiary group to invest in its own mechanism 
of legal influence in an effort to restore the lost benefit. This investment, 
in turn, may inspire the regulated group to reinvest in mechanisms of in-
fluence, leading to a full-fledged cycle of regulatory competition. The 
cycle continues as long as each group values sufficiently the prize of a 
law tailored in its favor. 
Just as group identity and dynamics influenced the actions of the 
regulated group, we should expect them to do the same for the benefic i-
ary group. An organized, politically effective beneficiary group faced 
 
70 See discussion of group dynamics, supra text accompanying notes 59–64. 
71 Cf. McCormick & Tollison, supra note 47 (modeling groups in competition for legisla-
tive wealth transfers). 
72 See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). 
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with evasion may turn to the legislature with a request to “restore the 
balance.” On the other hand, diffuse benefic iaries may do little to react 
effectively. 
Consider the following contrast. The P2P story features a subset of 
music consumers, in ferocious competition with the music industry, try-
ing to avoid copyright laws. Faced with a threat to their copyright rents, 
the industry reacted with litigation, lobbying, and even technological 
countermeasures (detailed in Part III). In contrast, avoidance of state 
taxation through online and mail-order catalogues is now a regular phe-
nomenon. Yet the diffuse benefic iaries of state taxation have done little 
to resist the eroding collection of state value-added taxes.73 Unsurpris-
ingly, the organization of the beneficiaries matters as much as the or-
ganization of the regulated. 
The notions of regulatory competitions are a favorite subject of the 
rent-seeking literature, and it is tempting to cast matters in such terms. 
Professor Anne Krueger’s original description of rent-seeking suggested 
that laws create rents and that people will compete for them in various 
ways: “[s]ometimes, such competition is perfectly legal. In other in-
stances, rent seeking takes other forms, such as bribery, corruption, 
smuggling, and black markets.”74 Arguably, any group interested in 
changing a law to minimize its regulatory costs is engaged in a form of 
rent-seeking. The battle between P2P programmers and the recording 
industry, described in Part III, can be described as a gigantic dissipation 
of rents created by the monopolistic copyright system. 
Groups reacting to law are acting in a self-interested fashion, and this 
may lead to a competition to influence the law’s effects. For several rea-
sons, however, I am hesitant to cast the questions studied in this Part 
within the normative framework of rent-seeking. Rent-seeking is a use-
ful tool when it suggests that certain models of regulation will encourage 
wasteful behavior and should therefore be avoided. In other words, the 
study of rent-seeking is the study of waste management. The goals of 
this Part, however, are different. They are to develop a positive model 
describing the choices that groups face under burdensome regulation. 
Determining whether the reduction in rents is “worth” any particular le-
gal regime is beyond this Part’s scope. 
 
73 On the contrary, Congress passed the Internet Tax Freedom Act, 47 U.S.C. 1151 (1998), 
restricting the power of states to tax Internet-based commerce . 
74 Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 Am. Econ. 
Rev. 291, 291 (1974). 
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In addition, the interests of the rent-seeking literature are different 
than those of this Article. What makes a tool interesting to the rent-
seeking literature is its potential for generating waste and the existence 
or absence of any socially valuable byproduct. Hence, what scholars 
study for rent-dissipating effects can range from research and develop-
ment (rent dissipation in pursuit of patent follow-ons)75 to follow-on 
creation in copyright76 to efforts to monopolize. 77 It is nonetheless ex-
tremely difficult to evaluate whether alternative mechanisms of under-
mining legal systems have less or more valuable byproducts.78 Is invest-
ing in a tax shelter more or less socially wasteful than lobbying? Such 
questions seem nearly impossible to answer. What this Part examines is 
not the relative wastefulness of mechanisms used to influence law, but 
their relative cost and relationship to group dynamics. 
F. How Code is Used to Avoid Law 
The premise of this Article is that “law-busting” code should be stud-
ied as a mechanism of legal influence. That is to say, it can usefully be 
studied alongside litigation, lobbying, tax avoision, and other ways 
groups seek to influence the law in their favor. This final Section asks: 
how exactly does code influence the effects of law? And how does it fit 
within the avoidance/change dichotomy just described? 
The hint of an answer comes from existing work that tries to under-
stand the role code plays in the legal environment.79 In Code and Other 
 
75 See generally, Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. 
& Econ. 265 (1977) (describing patents as prospects that prevent waste in follow-on deve l-
opment). 
76 See generally, Michael Abramowicz, Copyright Redundancy (Geo. Mason L. & Econ. 
Research Paper No. 03-03, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=374580 (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (arguing 
that copyright laws prevent wasteful redundancy) . 
77 See e.g., Richard Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly, 83 J. Pol. Econ. 807 (1975) 
(modeling and estimating social costs of monopoly and monopoly-inducing regulation in the 
U.S.). 
78 See id. at 811 (analyzing assumption that expenditures on monopolizing have no so-
cially beneficial byproduct). 
79 A common question is this: Is there any particular significance to code in this regard, as 
opposed to just advances in technology and their effects on compliance? The argument for a 
special relevance for code relies on the idea that computer code has achieved a greater 
granularity than the technologies that preceded it: Programmers can very precisely shape be-
havior using code to match the particularized loopholes in laws. At previous levels of tech-
nology, conversely, such questions would arise less frequently. 
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Laws of Cyberspace, Professor Lawrence Lessig writes that “[i]n cyber-
space we must understand how code regulates . . . . Code is law.”80 
Similarly, writers like Professors Tom Bell or Kenneth Dam, interested 
in “technological self-help,” are primarily concerned with the use of 
code as a substitute for contract, copyright, or other legal systems.81 
Even though this work is interested in code “as law,” its depiction of 
how code achieves regulatory effects if useful. The idea is that code 
regulates by directly constraining behavior. Lessig argues that code 
“constitute[s] a set of constraints on how you behave;”82 it “constrains 
some behavior by making other behavior possible, or impossible.”83 Just 
as a brick wall built in the middle of the road modifies behavior, code 
regulates by specifiying, in advance, what behavior is and is not possi-
ble. Similarly, I propose that code can influence the effects of law by re-
designing behavior for legal advantage. That is to say, the reason that 
code matters for law at all is its capability to define behavior on a mass 
scale. This capability can mean constraints on behavior, in which case 
code regulates, but it can also mean shaping behavior into legally advan-
tageous forms. 
In this view, the code designer acts like a tax lawyer. He looks for 
loopholes or ambiguities in the operation of law (or, sometimes, ethics). 
More precisely, he looks for places where the stated goals of the law are 
different than its self -defined or practical limits. The designer then re-
designs behavior to exploit the legal weakness. 
Code design, as we have seen it, is a mechanism of avoidance rather 
than a mechanism of change. Nothing the code designer does rewrites 
laws. Instead, code design defines behavior to avoid legal sanctions. 
This description of how code “works” to influence law’s effects, I sug-
gest, fits most of the major efforts to use code for legal advantage. Con-
sider four examples: 
Virtual Child Pornography. Congress passes a law banning child por-
nography, citing a compelling interest in preventing harm to children. 
Programmers create child pornography that involve no children in its 
 
80 Lessig, supra note 3, at 89. 
81 See Bell, supra note 4 (model of technological self-help); Dam, supra note 4 (same). 
82 Lessig, supra note 3, at 6, 89. 
83 Id. 
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production. The behavior has been reshaped to adapt to the limit on gov-
ernment’s power in the First Amendment.84 
Overseas Gambling. Laws banning gambling are territorial in juris-
diction. Casinos place their servers overseas. The conduct of gambling 
has been reshaped to avoid the law’s self-defined jurisdictional limits. 
Junk Email. Unsolicited advertising by mail and fax are regulated by 
laws specific to the mail system and fax machine, respectively. Adver-
tisers design programs to transmit electronic mail and pop-up advertise-
ments. The use of junk email gives advertisers an unregulated partial 
substitute for the mail or fax machines. 
P2P Filesharing. The legality and ethics of “home copying” are 
somewhat ambiguous, and copyright has no record of enforcement 
against end-users. Designers build software that shapes the mass distri-
bution of copyrighted works into a form resembling home copying. 
None of this, of course, is a comment on whether these strategies will 
be successful in the long term. Each, as previous sections suggesst, may 
incur a reaction to the reaction—an effort to change the law to “restore 
the balance.” But it is clear from these examples how code design 
achieves its effects. 
This basic theory of mechanisms underlies the claims in the rest of the 
Article. Part II examines the important example of P2P filesharing to 
show how, in practice, the design of code influences the effects of law. 
II. COPYRIGHT’S LOOPHOLES 
On December 8, 1999, a group of eighteen record companies an-
nounced that they had sued a small startup company for copyright in-
fringement. 85 The Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”) 
forecast that it could do 100 million dollars in damage to sales,86 yet the 
company was virtually unknown. In the mainstream press the company 
had previously drawn only a blurb, described by Fortune magazine as “a 
unique online MP3 trading community . . . that enables users to trade 
songs directly.”87 
 
84 Cf. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002) (striking down ban on 
computer-generated child pornography). 
85 See Don Clark, Recording Industry Group Sues Napster, Alleging Copyright Infringe-
ment on Net, Wall St. J., Dec. 9, 1999, at B18. 
86 Id. 
87 Lauren Goldstein, Tune In: MP3 goes mainstream, but Internet music has yet to find its 
perfect form, Tune In, Fortune, Dec. 1, 1999, at 268. 
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This unknown company was Napster. Its product was an application 
that facilitated the trading of music files. Napster functioned like a “ba-
zaar,” alleged the plaintiffs,88 but one where the goods were all free. Us-
ers logged in, searched a central database of songs that other users had 
made available, and then took the files they wanted directly from other 
users.89 Lawyers for the recording industry accused the little company of 
operating a “haven for music piracy on an unprecedented scale” and an 
“online bazaar” for illegal trading. 90 Napster responded that it simply 
provided a “lis ting service.”91 
If not as ruinous as the recording industry suggested it would be,92 
Napster emerged as a powerful force in the distribution of music. At its 
height, Napster claimed sixty million registered users and as many as 
twenty-six million active ones.93 By February of 2001, analysts esti-
mated that Napster users were trading nearly three billion songs, or the 
equivalent of two hundred million CDs, in a single month.94 The eco-
nomic effects of Napster on the music industry were, naturally, disputed 
in litigation. 95 According to some figures, global music sales tumbled 
 
88 Complaint at 2, A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000) 
(No. C99-5183-MHP), available at http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/napster/ 
riaa/napster_complaint.pdf (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) [hereinafter 
Complaint]. 
89 See Damien A. Riehl, Peer-to-Peer Distribution Systems: Will Napster, Gnutella and 
Freenet Create a Copyright Nirvana or Gehenna?, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1761, 1768 
(2001). 
90 Complaint, supra note 88, at 2. 
91 Clark, supra note 85. 
92 See Complaint, supra note 88, at 3 (alleging that “Napster’s conduct has caused and con-
tinues to cause plaintiffs grave and irreparable harm”). 
93 The estimates of Napster’s use vary. See, e.g., Jon Healey, Napster CEO Pitching a New 
Tune to Labels, L.A. Times, Nov. 25, 2001, at C5 (reporting sixty million active users at 
Napster’s peak); Napster Use Slumps 65%, BBC News, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1449127.stm (July 20, 2001) (on file with the Virginia 
Law Review Association) (reporting statistics from Jupiter Media Metrix stating that Napster 
had 26.4 million active users in February 2001 before the numbers began to decline). 
94 See Geoff Nicholson, Will the RIAA pass up Napster’s $1 billion offer?, at 
http://www.hitsquad.com/smm/news/708/ (Feb. 21, 2001) (on file with the Virginia Law Re-
view Association). 
95 See A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 909–11 (N.D. Cal. 2000) 
(summarizing the findings of several studies of Napster’s economic impact). A later study by 
economist Stan Leibowitz concludes that Napster’s effects were not proven in the Napster 
litigation, but that peer filesharing should be expected to hurt the music industry in the long 
term. Stan Liebowitz, Policing Pirates in the Networked Age 14–15 (Cato Policy Analysis 
No. 438 May 15, 2002), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa438.pdf (on file with 
the Virginia Law Review Association). 
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nearly half a billion dollars in 2000. 96 Sales of CD singles (the clearest 
Napster competitor) declined nearly forty percent that year.97 In contrast, 
other studies suggested that Napster actually led its users to buy more 
CDs.98 
How did any of this happen? How did a simple program have such a 
powerful effect on levels of compliance with copyright law? Everyone 
knows the basic story, but students of enforcement and compliance lack 
an explanation for why the copyright regime, relative to other sets of 
laws, proved so vulnerable to code-based attack. What is it about the en-
forcement structure of the copyright system that made it so easy to de-
feat? And does it share characteristics with other legal enforcement sys-
tems? 
This Part argues that the success of P2P depends on two powerful and 
often unrecognized weaknesses of the copyright regime. The first is the 
law’s dependence on a gatekeeper enforcement regime. The second is a 
severe and unusual lack of normative support among the regulated. 
These weaknesses suggest several conclusions about the nature of 
P2P and code design as mechanisms of avoidance. P2P, in particular, 
probably implicates the specific weaknesses of the copyright system 
more than it implicates vulnerabilities in other sets of legal rules. As a 
general rule, code design will depend on identifiable weaknesses in legal 
enforcement. 
A. Copyright and Its Gatekeepers 
Common intuitio n dictates that laws can be vulnerable to mass dis-
obedience, whether at rock concerts or during tax time. These problems 
stem from the limits and costs of “primary” enforcement (enforcement 
against individual violators). The costs of raising punishments increase 
while the benefits exhibit diminishing returns. Theorists explain these 
limits as stemming from administrative and third party costs, the limited 
 
96 Patrick Brethour, Music sales tumble 1.3% worldwide, The Globe and Mail (Boston), 
Apr. 20, 2001, at B1. 
97 Jeff Leeds, Record Industry Says Napster Hurt Sales, L.A. Times, Feb. 24, 2001, at C1. 
98 See Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 910 (citing several studies but refusing to rely on them); 
Kim Chipman, Napster More Likely to Help, Not Hurt, Music Sales, Bloomberg News, July 
21, 2000 (noting that “most attrition [cited by the RIAA] took place before Napster’s 
launch”); Liam Lahey, Angus Reid Study: Napster is improving CD sales, ComputerWorld 
Canada, Sept. 22, 2000, at 1, available  at 
http://www.itworldcanada.com/portals/portalDisplay.cfm?oid=E19EF5FC-8783-45AE-
AB14E3C8BA85856F (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). 
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net worth of defendants, the lack of any punishment beyond the death 
penalty, and even the constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishments.99 
Due to the limitations of primary enforcement, many legal regimes 
charged with mass regulation come to depend on supplemental enforce-
ment measures. A chief example is what Professor Kraakman termed a 
“gatekeeper” regime. 100 To supplement direct enforcement of a law, the 
state attaches liability to the provision of specialized goods or services, 
disrupting misconduct in advance.101 Doctors, for example, are gate-
keepers for prescription drugs. By withholding their provision of drugs 
to would-be abusers, doctors aid in the enforcement of the laws regulat-
ing controlled substances. 
Copyright law’s long dependence on a gatekeeping regime is under-
recognized.102 The copyright law regulates a large and disparate group of 
content consumers, such as music listeners and book readers. The solu-
 
99 These reasons are summarized in Posner, supra note 25, at 243–50; Kraakman, supra 
note 10, at 56–57. See also Katyal, supra note 35, at 2414–15 (“But the range of sanction 
levels may be subject to a maximum sanction constraint—either because there is no room for 
increased penalty (beyond death) or because such equality in punishment would contravene 
other, moral, theories of punishment.”). 
100 Kraakman, supra note 10, at 53. 
101 In his influential 1986 article, Kraakman demonstrated that “gatekeeper liability” could 
create additional deterrence relative to primary enforcement. See id. at 87–93. That article 
has inspired a gatekeeper literature, primarily focused on gatekeepers in the financial ser-
vices industries. See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 916, 918 (1998) (arguing that analysis of reputational intermediaries remains incom-
plete without consideration of a variety of additional factors); Luigi Alberto Franzoni, Inde-
pendent Auditors as Fiscal Gatekeepers, 18 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 365, 365 (1998) (analyzing 
gatekeeper regimes in tax enforcement); Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Pro-
fession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 Md. L. Rev. 869, 883–84 (1990) (analyzing the 
gatekeeper role lawyers play in avoiding strategic litigation); Frank Partnoy, Barbarians At 
The Gatekeepers?: A Proposal For A Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 Wash. U. L.Q. 
491, 491–93 (2001) (arguing for a strict liability gatekeeper regime for securities fraud). 
None, however, considers a statute’s dependence on gatekeeper liability to be a potential 
weakness. 
102 One notable exception to this generalization is Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry 
Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47 Antitrust Bull. 423, 432 (2002). A similar notion 
is reflected in the distinction between “broad-based” and “targeted” enforcement in Rick 
Harbaugh & Rahul Khemka, Does copyright enforcement encourage piracy? (Claremont 
Colleges working paper in economics, Aug. 2001), available at 
http://econ.mckenna.edu/papers/2000-14.pdf (on file with the Virgin ia Law Review Associa-
tion). One reason copyright’s dependence on gatekeepers may be under-recognized is possi-
bly because most of copyright law is found under the civil, as opposed to the criminal titles 
of the law. Yet there is no reason to suppose from first principles that a civil regime cannot 
also harness the power of a gatekeeper liability regime. 
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tion to mass disobedience in this area has involved one such gatekeeper 
regime. That is, copyright law achieved compliance through the imposi-
tion of liability on a limited number of intermediaries—those capable of 
copying and distributing works on a mass scale. The gatekeepers were 
book publishers at first; later gatekeepers included record manufacturers, 
film studios, and others who produced works on a mass scale. Their role 
resembled that of doctors with respect to prescription drugs—they pre-
vented evasion of the law by blocking the opportunity to buy an infring-
ing product in the first place. 
That intermediaries play some role in copyright enforcement is 
widely recognized 103—it could not be otherwise after the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios.104 Writers have hinted at the potential dependence of copyright 
on a gatekeeper system. As Professor Jane Ginsberg noted in 1995: 
Copyright owners have traditionally avoided targeting end users of 
copyrighted works. This is in part because pursuing the ultimate con-
sumer is costly and unpopular. But the primary reason has been be-
cause end users did not copy works of authorship—or if they did copy, 
the reproduction was insignificant and rarely the subject of widespread 
further dissemination.105 
There is evidence to suggest that copyright was in fact entirely depend-
ent on gatekeeper enforcement until quite recently. Unfortunately, aca-
demic study of copyright enforcement is sparse. 106 What we can learn 
about enforcement patterns comes largely from the few hearings and 
 
103 See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright 111 (2001) (“Our copyright laws have, un-
til now, focused primarily on the relationships among those who write works of authorship 
and disseminate those works to the public.”); Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars On The “I n-
formation Superhighway”: Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1466, 1488 (1995) (discussing the role of intermediaries). 
104 464 U.S. 417 (1984). In the Sony litigation, the broadcasting industry targeted Sony 
and its new Betamax videotape recorder, as opposed to end-users, when it unsuccessfully 
tried to have Sony held contributorily liable for any illegal taping of television shows. Id. at 
456. 
105 Ginsburg, supra note 103, at 1488. 
106 While many authors discuss the challenge of new technology for intellectual property 
laws, it is difficult to find academic work on actual patterns of enforcement. One student 
note has tackled the problem, relying principally on congressional sources. See Jayashri Sri-
kantiah, The Response of Copyright to the Enforcement Strain of Inexpensive Copying 
Technology, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1634, 1643–45 (1996). 
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congressional studies on copyright enforcement and the case record it-
self. 
Reflecting an interest in bigger targets, copyright laws reflected an 
indifference to private, home copying in the 1960s and early 1970s. In 
1971, Congress commented that copyright was never meant to “restrain 
the home recording, from broadcasts or from tapes or records, of re-
corded performances.”107 Congress described the practice of non-
commercial home recordings as “common and unrestrained.”108 In the 
1973 photocopying case Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, the 
United States Court of Claims similarly stated, “[I]t is almost unani-
mously accepted that a scholar can make a handwritten copy of an entire 
copyrighted article for his own use . . . . These customary facts of copy-
right-life are among our givens.”109 
Even in the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress made the decision to limit 
the exclusive right of performance of audiovisual works to public per-
formances, thereby excluding private or home performances.110 In rec-
ommending this limit, the Copyright Office explained that “[n]ew tech-
nical devices will probably make it practical in the future to reproduce 
televised motion pictures in the home. We do not believe the private use 
of such a reproduction can or should be precluded by copyright.”111 The 
law’s indifference toward home copying was evident in the obvious lack 
of enforcement. The case record is perhaps the strongest evidence of the 
operation of the old regime. One is pressed to find any example of copy-
right law being enforced against individuals for home copying (as op-
posed to commercial activity) prior to 1990. In the 1979 Sony Betamax 
case, copyright owners added a representative individual to the com-
plaint, but they did not seek relief against him. 112 Beyond this limited 
example, individualized infringement actions were absent until the 
1990s.113 
 
107 H.R. Rep. No. 92-487, at 7 (1971). 
108 Id. 
109 487 F.2d 1345, 1350 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 
(1975). 
110 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2000). 
111 Register of Copyrights, 87th Cong., Report of the Register of Copyrig hts on the Gen-
eral Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law 30 (Comm. Print 1961). 
112 Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 432 (C.D. Cal. 1979); 
see also Sony, 464 U.S. at 434 (“The two respondents in this case do not seek relief against 
the Betamax users who have allegedly infringed their copyrights.”). 
113 The 1990s saw an effort by software copyright owners to enforce copyrights against 
end-users, who tend to be fairly large entities. See, e.g., Elizabeth Hurt, Software Pirates 
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Dowling v. United States and others 
like it come closest to primary enforcement against individuals.114 
Dowling featured two Elvis enthusiasts who pressed unreleased re-
cordings without permission—so-called “bootleggers.”115 But these 
bootleggers actually created sizable distribution channels. The two hob-
byists grew to do “substantial business,”116 eventually functioning just 
like regular record-sellers themselves. They printed catalogs and adver-
tisements, and they sold and distributed thousands of albums.117 Were 
these Elvis bootleggers gatekeepers in the enforcement sense? They 
were, in the sense that the end-users of the Elvis bootlegs would be un-
able to obtain their product without the cooperation of Dowling and 
company. 
Mass home copying became an issue in the late 1980s and prompted 
some examination of how copyright enforcement worked.118 As the 
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment stated in its 1989 re-
port, “All U.S. copyright law, including the Copyright Act of 1976, pro-
ceeds on the assumption that effective and efficient copying is a large-
scale, publicly visible, commercial activity, and therefore, that legal 
prohibitions against unauthorized copying are enforceable.”119 This re-
port, echoed by hearings on copyright enforcement in the 1980s, con-
firmed that the existing pattern of enforcement by the RIAA and the mo-
tion picture industry targetted large-scale commercial pirates.120 After 
clarifying copyright’s long reliance on a gatekeeper system, one may 
 
Sued: Alleged culprits targeted online auction bidders, Business 2.0, (Jan. 26, 2001), at 
http://www.business2.com/articles/web/print/0,1650,16147,00.html (on file with the Virginia 
Law Review Association). For an argument that such enforcement actually creates more pi-
racy, see Harbaugh & Khemka, supra note 102, at 2. 
114 473 U.S. 207 (1985). Other examples of enforcement against small intermediaries in-
clude United States v. Drum, 733 F.2d 1503 (11th Cir. 1984) (enforcing against a bootle g-
ging enterprise), and Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Labus, No. 89-C-797-C, 1990 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 11754 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 23, 1990) (involving the operator of a small resort sued for 
renting pirated movies to his customers). 
115 473 U.S. at 210–11. 
116 Id. at 212. 
117 Id. at 211–12. 
118 The Office of Technology Assessment noted that the proportion of people who made 
home audiotapes doubled in the 1980s. Office of Tech. Assessment, supra note 11, at iii. 
119 Id. at 7. 
120 See Civil and Criminal Enforcement of the Copyright Laws: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th 
Cong. 41 (1985) (statement of Donald C. Curran, Acting Register of Copyrights) (“RIAA is 
selective in what they refer to Justice, turning over only the most egregious cases.”). 
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specify more precisely why the changes of the 1980s and 1990s altered 
the face of copyright enforcement. 
B. The Erosion of the Gatekeeper System 
Gatekeeper regimes have an obvious weakness: They depend on a 
specialized good or service remaining specialized. For the 270 years fo l-
lowing copyright’s 1710 debut, this remained the case for copyrighted 
works—copies could not be produced by just anyone. As demonstrated 
by Dowling, there could and did arise corruptible publishers who would 
produce illicit copies (just as corruptible doctors hand out illicit drugs), 
but so long as the costs of finding such corrupted intermediaries re-
mained reasonable, gatekeeper liability continued to prevent copyright 
infringement. 
The erosion of copyright’s gatekeeper system is an ongoing and in-
complete process. The erosion proceeded in several steps, culminating in 
the advanced versions of P2P filesharing networks evident today. 
Digitalization—the ability to make perfect digital copies of content—
was the beginning of a real problem for the gatekeeper regime. It made 
copying certain forms of content possible for anyone with a computer. 
As the Office of Technology Assessment documented in 1989, the ex-
tent of an individual’s copying power was mainly limited to computer 
software and analog taping of television programs and music.121 By the 
1990s, an individual’s ability to copy spread to music (with the advent 
of powerful compression algorithms) and, to some extent, books and 
film. 
It is important to understand that digitalization itself did not mean the 
end of the gatekeeper system: It simply put home copying within easy 
reach. Mass distribution, however, remained (and still remains, for most 
works) a gate kept by a few. So long as mass distributors of content re-
mained identifiable and easy to sue—retail outlets, publishers, and so 
on—the gatekeeper regime could remain effective. 
Hence, the mass popularity of the Internet in the mid -1990s was an-
other step toward the erosion of the gatekeeper system. But it is also a 
mistake to confuse the potential of the Internet as a mass dissemination 
system with the development of an application for such purposes.122 
 
121 See Office of Tech. Assessment, supra note 11, at iii. 
122 See generally, Wu, supra note 7 (pointing out that the Internet and its applications 
should be understood separately for legal ana lysis). 
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Web-based Internet outlets—say, online retailers like Amazon.com—
were and are no less amenable to being copyright gatekeepers. However, 
it took the design of P2P filesharing systems to realize the full extent of 
the network’s structural challenge to a gatekeeper liability system. 
A pure P2P design is the logical corollary to a gatekeeper enforce-
ment system. The design goal of a pure P2P network is the complete 
elimination of intermediaries. Such a pure P2P network is a network of 
perfect equals, each of which is both a consumer and a distributor of 
copyrighted materials. Such a network would force those who enforce 
copyrights to rely exclusively on primary enforcement, with its attendant 
difficulties. 
Today’s successful P2P filesharing applications approach, but do not 
achieve, a pure P2P model. The following Section explains why. 
C. Elements of Peer Design 
The design of P2P applications to avoid copyright presents a technical 
challenge with implications not fully appreciated by legal scholarship.123 
The technical study of P2P design shows that designing a P2P fileshar-
ing network to avoid copyright requires important deviations from the 
optimal design for speed, control, and usability. The programmers of a 
copyright-resistant P2P network must balance an interest in avoiding le-
gal liability against the competing interests of ensuring performance on a 
mass scale, maintaining system stability, and fostering network trust. 
These matters all require control over the network, while a pure peer de-
sign eliminates control as much as possible. 
The goals of peer filesharing applications are a good place to begin 
the discussion. Two people can trade files easily, using e-mail or a 
floppy disk, but what about one million people? The general goal of a 
P2P filesharing network is to enable millions of home users to trade files 
amongst themselves, quickly and easily. Such a program generally re-
quires three elements. First, it requires a program that regular home us-
ers can download—a program that, running on their computers, can lo-
cate other users, creating a network of peers. Second, it requires a way 
for each user to search the network (or parts of it) to determine what 
 
123 For a good summary of some of these challenges, see Theodore Hong, Performance, in  
Peer-to-Peer: Harnessing the Benefits of a Disruptive Technology 203, 205–06 (Andy Oram 
ed., 2001). 
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content others are making available. Third, it requires a way for users to 
send files to each other once they have found something desirable. 
Designers accomplish these filesharing goals using a P2P design. 
Formally, a P2P network is an application architecture where each 




Figure 1: Design of a Peer-to-Peer versus a Client-Server Net-
work  
 
This design, as the name suggests, makes a P2P network one of 
equals, or peers. This network architecture should, usually, be distin-
guished from a “client-server” network in which one computer (the 
server) specializes in serving the needs of others (the clients). 
Real-world metaphors help capture this important distinction. Con-
sider the difference between a study group comprised entirely of stu-
dents and a lecture led by a teacher. On the one hand, the study group is 
a peer network. Each member has both the responsibility to share mate-
rials and the right to take materials from others. On the other hand, the 
classroom is a “client-server” network. The teacher specializes in teach-
ing the students. The students do not teach the teacher or each other. The 
network is centralized, and each node is specialized. 
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A pure peer design is “flat,” with equal, non-specialized members. 
Client-server designs are hierarchical, with a specialized server. Each 
design has it own uses, but only peer networks threaten the gatekeeper 
structure of copyright enforcement. 
D. Purity in Peer Design 
The distinction between peer and client-server designs is critical to 
understanding the challenge of building a network that resists copyright 
enforcement. The closer a network comes to a pure P2P design, the more 
disparate the targets for copyright infringement and the greater the threat 
to a gatekeeper system. 
Why not always build the most decentralized design possible? The 
general answer is that it is difficult. Indeed, within the technical com-
munity, variations from “purity” are so commonplace that there are 
healthy debates over what should even be considered a peer network.125 
Pure peer networks are a design challenge because eliminating inter-
mediaries decreases control over the network. The loss of control makes 
it difficult to ensure performance on a mass scale, to establish network 
trust, and even to perform simple tasks like keeping statistics. As net-
works grow, these problems become more pronounced. It is simple, in 
other words, to build a pure P2P network for six friends interested in 
trading, just as it is simple to maintain a study group with six members. 
It is difficult, however, to make the same design work for ten million 
people. 
In practice, there are four recognized classes of application design. 
They are pictured in Figures 1 and 2 and are summarized in Table 2. 
Figure 1 depicts the two extremes. The Internet’s most important appli-
cation, the World Wide Web, represents an archetypal client-server 
model. “Pure” peer design, meanwhile, is what the early version of the 
Gnutella peer filesharing programs adopted to avoid infringement liabil-
ity. 
 
125 See, e.g., Gene Kan, Gnutella, in Peer-to-Peer: Harnessing the Benefits of a Disruptive 
Technology, supra note 123, at 94, 117 (“the debate . . . burning in the technology commu-
nity . . . [is] what is truly peer-to-peer.”); Clay Shirky, What is P2P . . . And What Isn’t?, The 
O’Reilly Networks, at http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/p2p/ 
2000/11/24/shirky1-whatisp2p.html (Nov. 24, 2000) (on file with the Virginia Law Review 
Association) (arguing that the label describing what is happening to networks, “peer-to-
peer,” does not cla rify much). 
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It is often useful in a peer design to have at least one central server in 
which to store user information, search databases, and create a system of 
trust. Such a design forms the “centrally coordinated” peer network, pic-
tured on the right of Figure 2. Napster used this architecture, as do popu-
lar chat programs like AOL Instant Messenger. 126  
 
Figure 2: Hybrid Designs 
 
To complete the classification, many of the most well-known net-
works are hybrids that balance control and decentralization. They appear 
to be P2P networks to the end-users but they are actually only P2P be-
tween specialized servers. This “hierarchical peer-to-peer” network, pic-
tured on the left of Figure 2, supports regular Internet Protocol (“IP”) e-
mail, the Domain Name System (DNS), and the classic newsreader 
“USENET.”127 With e-mail, no central authority controls delivery of 
 
126 See Nelson Minar et al., A Network of Peers: Peer-to-Peer Models Through the History 
of the Internet, in Peer-to-Peer: Harnessing the benefits of a Disruptive Technology, supra 
note 123, at 3, 17. 
127 See M. Horton & R. Adams, The Internet Eng’g Task Force, Standard for Interchange 
of USENET Messages, at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1036.txt (1987) (on file with the Vir-
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messages. Rather, a particular university’s or company’s servers com-
municate with other institutional servers in a P2P fashion. 128 
 
 
Table 2: Types of Network and Examples 
 





World Wide Web 
 




Napster, Instant Messager 
 
Hierarchical Peer Network 
 
 
Email, Usenet, DNS 
 





As this discussion shows, what is called a peer network may be de-
centralized in only certain respects. Examining the life cycle of a node in 
a peer network shows how often intermediaries are needed to smooth the 
functioning of even the most basic network. Of course, every intermedi-
ary becomes a potential legal target. 
To begin life as a peer node, a user needs to install the appropriate 
software. This usually means downloading it from an intermediary 
(typically a web site). The node must find at least one peer to join the 
peer network, but how can this location be done without knowing a peer 
in advance? Again, the solution is usually reliance on some intermedi-
ary, such as a “host cache,” that grants the peer node one peer address so 
that the user may begin to use the network. 
To be useful, the peer node must have some ability to discover what 
content is available on the network. For example, in a network meant to 
 
128 See P. Mockapetris, The Internet Eng’g Task Force, Domain Names—Implementation 
and Specification, at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1035.txt (1987) (on file with the Virginia 
Law Review Association) (detailing design of domain name system). 
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share music, a user needs to know what songs are actually available, 
preferably by searching by artist, song title, etc. The very volume of 
search traffic thus generated, however, can strain a network design to the 
point of collapse.129 Designers may minimize this effect if they design 
the network to access a finite amount of content (for example, hit songs). 
Nonetheless, designing a network remains a fundamental challenge. It is 
easiest to store search information in one place, but if search information 
is centralized, as it is in the Napster design, it creates yet another spe-
cialized intermediary. 
Finally, peer networks need to provide for connections among peers. 
Here, the greatest problems for non-centralized peer models come from 
user abuse of anonymity. In a music network, copyright owners could 
potentially send around fake files. In network terms, this is the problem 
of “trust.” Trust systems are difficult, if not impossible, to create without 
some centralized system of verification. 
The preceding description is a summary of the challenges facing P2P 
technology. The point is that P2P design represents a serious challenge 
for designers because it requires compromise. Fewer intermediaries 
means fewer targets for an infringement lawsuit. The existence of fewer 
intermediaries, however, makes it harder for users to use the system, 
creates a greater risk of system crashes, and increases the risk of anony-
mous attacks. There is a tension between an optimal P2P filesharing net-
work and the goal of avoiding copyright liability. This condition will 
bear strongly in the examination of P2P programming incentives. The 
next Section considers how P2P designs have sidestepped social norms 
that might have prevented copyright infringement. 
E. Copyright and Social Norms 
According to a 2000 Pew Internet Project study, seventy-eight percent 
of those who download music do not consider it to be stealing and sixty-
one percent do not care if the music they download is copyrighted.130 A 
survey reported by two economists showed that only fourteen percent of 
respondents considered illegal copying of software to be a serious crime, 
compared to thirty percent who felt that way about driving forty miles 
per hour in a twenty-five miles-per-hour zone.131 These statistics suggest 
 
129 See Kan, supra note 125, at 112–14. 
130 See Lenhart et al., supra note 11, at 5. 
131 See Harbaugh & Khemka, supra note 102, at 6. 
 
144 Virginia Law Review Vol. 89:nnn 
that P2P applications have not only undermined copyright’s gatekeeper 
regime, but have also successfully sidestepped social norms that might 
otherwise bolster compliance with the copyright regime. This Section 
describes how code designers structured their applicatio ns to avoid so-
cial norms. 
As discussed above, theorists have suggested that the possibility of 
state punishment provides an incomplete explanation for observed com-
pliance with societal rules.132 Rather, they suggest that other systems of 
social control, including social norms, account for compliance. 133 While 
accounts differ, the arguments contend that some mix of the threat of ex-
ternal social sanctions,134 the fear of sending the wrong signals to oth-
ers,135 and the internalization of ethics136 creates compliance that exceeds 
what would be observed as a simple reaction to the threat of punishment. 
Those who benefit from copyright laws benefit from the norm that 
physically stealing a CD or DVD is socially unacceptable. They are hurt, 
however, by the norm that makes copying the same CD at home accept-
able. Despite their cosmetic differences, economically speaking, each 
instance of copying represents approximately the same economic loss in 
the form of a lost potential sale. 137 
Therefore, the system of social norms, like the gatekeeper regime, is 
an alternative mechanism for creating compliance with a given legal 
rule. If norms track the substance of legal rules, it stands to reason that a 
rational, widespread effort to reduce the costs of regulation may sidestep 
the enforcement of legal rules by manipulating social norms. If it were 
considered disgraceful to download music on the Internet, copyright 
compliance could be achieved without active, primary enforcement. The 
design of P2P networks, however, successfully exploits the status of 
 
132 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
133 Understanding exactly how norms operate to ensure compliance with legal rules is be-
yond the scope of this paper. For a new account of this issue see Mahoney & Sanchirico, su-
pra note 26, at 41–48 (suggesting that the state’s punishments play a role in sustaining 
strategies of cooperation with legal rules). 
134 A classic external sanction model is provided in Ellickson, supra note 15, at 124–26. 
135 The signaling theory is presented in Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social 
Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. Legal Stud. 765, 766–67 (1998). 
136 See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Ap-
proach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1643, 1661–66 (1996) 
(characterizing internalization as the precondition of a norm’s existence). 
137 Assuming a similar likelihood that the thief or friend would have otherwise paid the full 
price for the music. 
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copyright norms, taking full advantage of an existing ambiguity as to 
whether home, non-commercial copying is “wrong.” 
In one of the few disinterested studies of its time, the Congressional 
Office of Technology Assessment conducted a 1989 survey regarding 
attitudes toward home copying. 138 The study found a simple norm: peo-
ple think copying for friends is okay, but copying for money is wrong. 139 
More precisely, it found that large majorities (sixty-three percent) of 
consumers considered making a taped copy of audio materials for a 
friend to be “acceptable” or “perfectly acceptable.”140 On the other hand, 
the greater majority (seventy-six percent) found selling copied materials 
unacceptable. 141 The survey mirrors widespread anecdotal evidence142 
suggesting a normative difference between commercial and non-
commercial copying. 
P2P filesharing exploits this distinction brilliantly. P2P clients create 
no sensation or impression of stealing (the absence of this quality typi-
fies what Lior Strahilevitz would call “charismatic code” design). 143 In-
stead, the user is invited to a “community” of peers who exchange song 
files. A user, importantly, has no sense that she is “selling” copyrighted 
materials. The design therefore exploits the distinction between the ac-
ceptance of non-commercial copying and the non-acceptance of com-
mercial copying. While the economic consequences of peer filesharing 
could be large, the superficial absence of commercial exchange makes 









Figure 3: The Friendly Face of the Bear-Share Community 
 
138 See Office of Tech. Assessment, supra note 11, at 139–65. 
139 Id. at 163. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Jessica Litman, for example, argues that in general people “do not observe copyight 
rules in their daily behavior,” because “people don’t believe the copyright law says what it 
does say.” Litman, supra note 103, at 111–12. 
143 See Strahilevitz, supra note 12, at 549. 
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As an illustrative example, consider the BearShare client pictured 
above. There is little on the screen to suggest that a user is engaging in a 
morally ambiguous operation or is committing an act of theft. The 
friendly bear in BearShare is an icon of charismatic code. 
The exploitation of social norms seems to have succeeded in facilitat-
ing a robust filesharing community. The 2000 Pew Internet Project Sur-
vey overwhelmingly supports the view that those who use filesharing 
networks do not think they are stealing. 144 That same study also suggests 
that fifty-three percent of all Internet users, and forty percent of all 
Americans, think that by sharing music through the Internet they are not 
doing anything wrong.145 Along these same lines, a 2002 survey by 
Business Software Alliance found that only thirty-eight percent of Inter-
net users claimed they would never download a potentially pirated pro-
gram to save money.146 In the end, P2P networks not only exploit the 
limits of legal enforcement, but also dodge the system of social norms 
that fortifies the relevant legal rules. 
This Part has demonstrated that the success of P2P depends on the 
presence of certain vulnerabilities peculiar to copyright law. Part III 
considers the reaction of the beneficiaries of copyright law and the regu-
latory competition that followed it. 
 
144 Lenhart et al., supra note 11, at 5. 
145 Id. at 6. 
146 See Business Software Alliance, Survey Spotlights Growing Problem of Online Soft-
ware Piracy, at www.bsa.org/resources/2002-05-29.117.pdf (May 29, 2002) (on file with the 
Virginia Law Review Association). 
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III. THE EVOLUTION OF P2P DESIGN AND REGULATORY COMPETITION 
The years 1999 to 2003 represented a period of regulatory competi-
tion between P2P users and the incumbent industry. At stake were sub-
stantial rents—the monopoly rents obtainable when the copyright law is 
enforced. As the succeeding narrative shows, the two groups had differ-
ent comparative advantages: one had code, the other had litigation and 
legal change. In other words, the competition pitted methods of avoid-
ance against methods of change. 
There are two outstanding aspects to this story. The first is the degree 
to which code design evolved to better target the weaknesses of the 
copyright regime. Part II demonstrated that P2P networks were generally 
designed to target copyright’s dependence on a gatekeeper system and to 
exploit the lack of clear normative support for the copyright system. 
This Part will show that the design evolved to take advantage of a spe-
cific legal doctrine—copyright’s contributory liability doctrine—
embodied in the decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios,147 and elaborated in A & M Records v. Napster.148 
The second is the nature of the reaction to the P2P network. The re-
cording industry is obviously the beneficiary of the existing copyright 
laws, and the erosion of the gatekeeper regime provoked an investment 
in various mechanisms of legal change (investments in efforts to change 
copyright law). These patterns follow the model of regulatory competi-
tion described in Part I. 
A. Napster and its Predecessors 
While Napster was the first laboratory for a peer response, it was it-
self a reaction to an earlier model. The very first efforts at mass distribu-
tion of copyrighted materials employed a purely client-server model—
essentially, web sites with songs available for download. The company 
“MP3.com,” which debuted in 1996, is one well-known example. Its 
“My.MP3” service allowed users to download, among other things, 
copyrighted MP3 files, provided they owned the CD that corresponded 
to the file in question.149 This service effectively gave users remote ac-
cess to music that they already owned. 
 
147 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
148 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
149 See Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected 
World 192 (2001). 
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The architecture of My.MP3 and other web-based services, not the 
fair-use issue, is of particular interest here.150 My.MP3 relied on a pure 
client-server model. It placed a huge amount of copyrighted material in a 
single space. When the recording industry sued, the company’s activities 
were deemed clearly illegal under the traditional model of copyright en-
forcement. 151 The recording industry’s case was not much different, 
enforcement-wise, from the Elvis bootleggers in Dowling v. United 
States152—both were large, centralized copiers of copyrighted materials. 
Other sources of copyrighted sounds in the early 1990s were the 
primitive, anonymous websites that simply made MP3s available for 
download.153 But these sites faced two serious technological problems. 
First, if a site became popular it would quickly become overburdened 
with user traffic. Second, there were few reliable and straightforward 
means for finding such sites.154 
Then came Napster. The beta version of Napster debuted on June 1, 
1999. Napster’s revolutionary design was a response to the legal and 
technical problems of the web-based companies. As one commentator 
noted, “[Napster] was written to solve a problem—[legal] limitations on 
file copying.”155 
Napster eliminated the intermediary that had doomed My.MP3 and 
others. It designed a network that decentralized the infringing content, 
leaving the songs on the hard drives of individual home users. Napster 
differentiated itself from the traditional commercial copyright pirate by 
styling itself as a place to trade music rather than as a place to sell or dis-
tribute it. 
Napster, however, was not completely decentralized. Napster’s pro-
grammers, Shawn Fanning and Jordan Ritter, were also aware of the 
 
150 Because MP3.com required users to own the CD for the MP3s they were given the right 
to download, there was a good argument that MP3.com’s copying of the files to facilitate 
“space-shifting” was fair use. See id. at 193–94. 
151 See UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
152 473 U.S. 207 (1985). 
153 See Bruce Haring, You can’t stop the music on the Net: Recording industry debates 
MP3 piracy issue, USA Today, Nov. 4, 1998, at 5D, available at 1998 WL 5740934 (noting 
the “abundance of sites both legal and illegal”). 
154 For example, the website MP3Board offered a search engine for such sites and was 
quickly sued. See MP3Board v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., No. C-00-20606RMW, 
2001 WL 804502, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2001) (staying a California countersuit). 
155 Shirky, supra note 125, at 28. 
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challenge to P2P networks of operating on a mass scale. 156 Napster 
mixed client-server and peer elements in order to make the search for 
songs a fast and scalable solution. Hence, the Napster server facilitated 
both database searching and brokering of individual connections. 
The design scaled impeccably. While estimates vary, at its height, 
Napster had tens of millions of active users, an astonishing technological 
accomplishment.157 But the failure to remove itself as an intermediary 
with control over parts of the process made Napster, the company, a tar-
get for an infringement lawsuit. That lawsuit came on December 6, 
1999.158 
The infringement case against Napster boiled down to a question of 
control, intimately connected to the network design questions studied 
here. The situation would have been different if Napster had been a form 
of multi-purpose copying technology over which Napster itself had no 
specific power. This relationship between technology and ownership 
would have put Napster in the same position as cameras, VCRs, and 
other forms of “copying equipment” described in Sony Corp. of America 
v. Universal City Studios. 159 The makers of VCRs and photocopiers ob-
viously know that their products are often used to infringe copyright, but 
since they are powerless to do anything about these violations and be-
cause the equipment has substantial non-infringing uses, they are not 
made liable. 160 
Napster’s argument—that it was a mere instrument of both legal and 
illegal uses—was belied by its design. One overriding factual finding 
doomed the company: The court found that “[Napster] could block ac-
cess to the system by suppliers of the infringing material.”161 
This fact made Napster the sponsor, rather than just the instrument, of 
infringing conduct. Instead of a VCR, Napster’s design put it in the clas-
sic position of the dance hall that chooses to allow an infringing artist to 
 
156 See Jordan Ritter, Why Gnutella Can’t Scale. No, Really., at 
http://www.darkridge.com/~jpr5/doc/gnutella.html (Feb. 2001) (on file with the Virginia 
Law Review Association) (discussing scaling problems in P2P networks). 
157 See Healey, supra note 93. 
158 See A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
159 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (“[T]he sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other arti-
cles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used 
for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes.”). 
160 The Sony Court described this as the “staple article of commerce doctrine.” Id. 
161 A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001). See also id. at 
1023 (“The district court correctly determined that Napster had the right and ability to police 
its system.”). 
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play despite having the power to stop the performance.162 The Sony 
Court itself declared that when a defendant is “in a position to control 
the use of copyrighted works by others,” the “imposition of vicarious li-
ability is manifestly just.”163 
After the court found that Napster exercised control, holding it to be 
both a contributory and a vicarious infringer was easy. Napster’s design 
allowed the record industry to use the “notice and failure to remove” 
formula to prove knowledge (an element of contributory copyright in-
fringement). 164 The record industry sent Napster notice of thousands of 
infringing files available through the system and then proved that these 
files remained available for download.165 
On the issue of vicarious liability, the decisive legal question also in-
volved Napster’s degree of control. As the appeals court framed it, the 
question was whether Napster had “the right and ability to supervise the 
infringing activity and also ha[d] a direct financial interest in such ac-
tivities.”166 Napster’s architecture again provided an answer. As the 
court noted, “Napster retains the right to control access to its system.”167 
This ruling led Napster to bankruptcy 168 and also taught several legal 
lessons to P2P code designers. As the late Gene Kan, a post-Napster de-
veloper, wrote, “[T]he recording industry . . . is sensitizing software de-
velopers and technologists to the legal ramifications of their inventions. 
Napster looked like a pretty good idea a year ago, but today Gnutella 
and Freenet look like much better ideas.”169 Napster taught peer network 
designers that both lack of control and general functionality had to be 
 
162 The classic dance hall case is Dreamland Ball Room v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 
F.2d 354, 355 (7th Cir. 1929) (holding a dance hall liable for copyright infringement because 
they hired an infringing orchestra to supply music to paying customers). In contrast, land-
lords have traditionally not been held liable for the infringements of their tenants. See, e.g., 
Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1938) (refusing to hold a landlord liable for the 
copyright infringement committed by a tenant on the premises). 
163 Sony, 464 U.S. at 437. 
164 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020. This formula has become the favored technique for proving 
knowledge in service provider cases. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commu-
nication Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1373–75 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (allowing actual knowledge to 
be demonstrated in this manner). 
165 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022. 
166 Id. at 1022 n.6. 
167 Id. at 1023. 
168 The Ninth Circuit’s ruling on the preliminary injunction was the effective, but not the 
formal, end of the litigation over Napster. See A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 
1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming the district court’s preliminary injunction). 
169 Kan, supra note 125, at 121. 
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comprehensive and credible to avoid contributory liability. The relation-
ship between developers and peer networks needed to be more like that 
between Xerox and its photocopiers. The response, Napster suggested, 
should take the form of a protocol rather than an application. Email and 
Usenet had never been sued for copyright infringement, despite their 
widespread use for illegal purposes. The lesson was simple—Napster 
had not gone far enough. 
There was a flurry of attempts to succeed Napster; many so techno-
logically unsuccessful (Napigator) or so clearly liable under Napster 
(Scour) as to be unworthy of discussion. Over the years 1999-2002 there 
were approximately fifty-eight different filesharing clients released to 
the market. 170 Of those, only four or five have enjoyed lasting signifi-
cance.171 One successor was different. It was founded on concepts of 
radical decentralization and was clearly designed to avoid the copyright 
lawsuit that had befallen Napster. That successor was the protocol 
named Gnutella. 
B. Early Gnutella: 2000-2001 
“Before [Gnutella], systems were centralized and boring.”172 
 
Gnutella was a child of the open-source movement. Its unusual name, 
non-linear development origins, and relative difficulty of use are all 
hallmarks of an open-source work product.173 Gnutella delivered a radi-
 
170 The compiled list of filesharing clients from 1999–2002 includes: Abe’s MP3 finder, 
Aimster (now named Madster), Ares, Audio-Galaxy, AudioGnome, BadBlue, Bearshare, 
Blubster, CuteMX.Com, DirectConnect, eDonkey, FileAngel, Filetopia, File Navigator, File 
Rogue, FileSpree, Free Haven, Freenet, Frost, Gnotella, Gnucleus, Gnutella 0.56, Gnutmeg, 
Grokster, Groove Network, Hotline Communications, iMesh, iSwipe, Junge Monkey, Ka-
ZaA, KonSpire, Limewire, Mactella, Mojo Nation, Morpheus, MyNapster, Myster, NapMX, 
Napster, Nutella, Ohaha, OnSystem, OpenNap, Phex, Phosphor, Pointera, Publius, Qtella, 
Qube, Scour.com, Shareaza, Spinfrenzy, SongSpy, Taxee, Voodoo Vision, WinMX, Xolox. 
Of course, many of these are clients for the same networks, as in the multiple GnutellaNet 
and FastTrack clients. 
171 In focusing on the major developments, some might argue that I have shortchanged 
programs like Scour.com and Aimster in the process. 
172 Kan, supra note 125. 
173 Gnutella was released in March of 2000. It was invented by Justin Frankel and Tom 
Pepper, two programmers working for AOL’s Nulls oft. Id. at 95. AOL quashed the effort, 
but Gnutella’s cause was picked up by the open-source movement. See Andy Oram, 
Gnutella and Freenet Represent True Technological Innovation, at 
http://www.oreillynet.com/lpt/a/208 (May 5, 2000) (on file with the Virginia Law Review 
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cally decentralized design that made it a darling of academic study. The 
design was an intentional effort to create a filesharing protocol that 
could avoid a lawsuit. Although it succeeded, it did so at the expense of 
social and scalability problems. 
Gnutella’s decentralization was nearly absolute. No single node on 
the early Gnutella network was different than any other. Searching, file 
transferring, and peer finding were all accomplished without the creation 
of specialized intermediaries. The only identifiable intermediaries were 
those relatively limited sites that made the early Gnutella client (version 
0.56) available for download. 
Gnutella developers compare the network they designed to a cocktail 
party where users trade files with whomever happens to be nearby. 174 
The design implements the idea that “Gnutella is not a program, it is a 
protocol.”175 In other words, Gnutella’s designers created a filesharing 
network—GnutellaNet—that was unowned and uncontrolled and to 
which various Gnutella programs could provide access. The relationship 
between the application and the network was similar to that between 
various email programs (Eudora, Microsoft Outlook, Hotmail) and the 
one-serves-all email network that cannot be said to be owned by anyone. 
GnutellaNet was designed as a general filesharing network capable of 
sharing any computer file. 176 
Gnutella was a success on the legal front. Gnutella’s radical decen-
tralization avoided the legal liability that had plagued Napster. To date, 
neither GnutellaNet nor its main application designers have been sued,177 
despite the substantial volume of infringement they facilitate. 
 
Association). Gnutella’s full development followed (and still follows) the non-linear path 
characteristic of open-source code. Id. 
174 See Kan, supra note 125, at 97–98. 
175 From Strategic Vision to a 10-Point Tactical Plan: A followup to The Revolution Will 
Be Webcast (working paper), at http://economicdemocracy.org/counterspinner. 
html (last visited Mar. 20, 2003) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). 
176 This characteristic was even more evident in another network, FreeNet, aimed at 
achieving the goals of the World Wide Web (storage of information) in a decentralized, 
purely P2P fashion. A discussion of the methods used by FreeNet can be found in Ian Clarke 
et al., Freenet: A Distributed Anonymous Information Storage and Retrieval System, in De-
signing Privacy Enhancing Technologies: International Workshop on Design Issues in Ano-
nymity and Unobservability 46 (Hannes Federrath ed., 2001); see also Adam Langley, 
Freenet, in Peer-to-Peer: Harnessing the Benefits of a Disruptive Technology, supra note 
123, at 123 (describing the development and structure of Freenet). 
177 It is true that Morpheus switched to Gnutella after it was sued as one of the three Fast-
Track companies, but no Gnutella developer qua Gnutella developer has been sued. 
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The early GnutellaNet, however, was plagued by stability and per-
formance problems attributable to its decentralized design. In late July 
of 2000, the Gnutella network underwent its first major crash, leaving 
the network unusable for more than a month. 178 The 2000 crash was the 
first sign that the early Gnutella client design had traded resistance to 
litigation for system instability. 
Commentators quickly diagnosed the problem.  179 Early GnutellaNet’s 
stability relied on users’ willingness to donate both bandwidth and mu-
sic files to a common cause and to limit judiciously their own use of the 
network. Once a certain number of users joined the network, stark dif-
ferences in user bandwidth and the lack of a central mechanism for allo-
cating traffic to more capable users made a crash inevitable. While some 
touted the theoretical scaling capabilities of Gnutella, 180 the instability of 
early GnutellaNet was undeniable. In addition to the scaling problem, 
there were also “social” problems. There was no incentive (not even so-
cial incentives, given the anonymous nature of the network) to act self-
lessly. A 2000 Xerox/PARC study established that almost seventy per-
cent of Gnutella users shared no files and that nearly fifty percent of all 
responses were returned by the top one percent of sharing hosts.181 
While this did not necessarily matter if the goal was trading the 100 
most popular songs, Napster’s deeper appeal had been the range of con-
tent it made available. The lack of any mechanism to police selfishness 
in Gnutella compromised the potential of the common solution. 
 
178 See Steve McCannell, The Second Coming of Gnutella, WebReview (Mar. 2, 2000), at 
http://www.webreview.com/mmedia/2001/03_02_01.shtml  (on file with the Virginia Law 
Review Association) (detailing reasons for the crash). Interestingly, the crash came directly 
in the wake of the Napster injunction as thousands of Napster users attempted to migrate to 
Gnutella. Id. The crash provided a dramatic demonstration of the difference in scaling capa-
bilities between the two approaches. 
179 See id; Matei Ripeanu, Peer-to-Peer Architecture Case Study: Gnutella Network, at 
http://www.cs.uchicago.edu/files/tr_authentic/TR-2001-26.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2003) 
(on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (describing Gnutella’s scaling prob-
lems); Ritter, supra note 156; See also Hong, supra note 123, at 206–07 (summarizing a now 
unavailable Clip2 study of the crash). A network engineer would diagnose the problem as 
follows: Gnutella’s layer 7 topology did not map carefully to the physical network, meaning 
the network failed to make use of available resources. 
180 Gene Kan, for example, argued that Gnutella would scale perfectly well, and that the 
2000 crash was caused by an inappropriate add-on technology. Kan, supra note 125, at 109–
17. 
181 Eytan Adar & Bernardo A. Huberman, Free Riding on Gnutella, 5 First Monday 10 
(Oct. 2000), at http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue5_10/adar/index.html (on file with the 
Virginia Law Review Association). 
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The problems of Gnutella 2000 were generally recognized,182 yet 
Gnutella’s failures were not the end of the peer filesharing response. The 
crashes and instability led to a new generation of peer filesharing soft-
ware. These new-generation programs, bearing names such as KaZaA, 
Grokster, Morpheus, and BearShare, are, for now, the latest chapter of 
the peer response story. 
C. The KaZaA Era: 2001 - Present 
The legal vulnerabilities of Napster and the stability and social prob-
lems of Gnutella inspired a new approach. Led by the enigmatic KaZaA, 
and its FastTrack engine, a new generation of peer-sharing applications 
tried to strike a balance between suability and scalability. Unlike the 
original Gnutella, they allowed some hierarchy and made some effort to 
engineer polite behavior. At the same time, they tried to avoid the cen-
tralized control that doomed Napster. The results are programs of great 
sophistication, attuned carefully to the doctrines of copyright. 
The new generation reintroduced hierarchy among users. They cre-
ated a distinction between “regular peers” and “superpeers” based on de-
tected resources—in particular, bandwidth. 183 In this hierarchy, college 
students are on top: high bandwidth users (college students on university 
networks, home DSL, and cable users) are superpeers, while dial-up us-
ers (home modem users) are regular peers. 
Dozens of programs grew into the technological gap between Napster 
and Gnutella. Only a few, however, reached mass scale for any length of 
time.184 
1. FastTrack & KaZaA 
FastTrack returned filesharing to an enterprise of substantial scale. In 
late 2001, the FastTrack network grew to be the largest filesharing net-
work since Napster, with an average of two to four million users online 
 
182 See Hong, supra note 123, at 206–07; McCannell, supra note 178; Ripeanu, supra note 
179. 
183 Names vary: BearShare groups users into “ultrapeers” and “leafs.” See BearShare, 
Gnutella Good Citizen Tips, at http://www.bearshare.com/help/citizen.htm (last visited Feb. 
9, 2003) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). 
184 Some of the more major programs from this period not discussed here include Audio-
Galaxy, Aimster (now named Madster), WinMX, iMesh, and OpenNAP. 
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at any given time. 185 Dutch programmers Niklas Zennstrom and Janus 
Friis created the FastTrack protocol late in 2000 and wrote a client ap-
plication, KaZaA, to access the FastTrack network. 186 Unlike Gnutella, 
the protocol was never released as an open-source standard.187 Instead, 
KaZaA insisted that companies pay to access the FastTrack network. 
The companies Grokster and Morpheus 188 did so, creating several client 
alternatives. 
The FastTrack companies fit somewhere between early Gnutella and 
Napster in their elimination of intermediaries. The protocol borrows 
heavily from Gnutella. It also maintains the distinction between the pro-
tocol and the clients; the company KaZaA, for instance, maintains no 
power to “shut down” the network.189 
FastTrack deviates from the pure design of early Gnutella in several 
significant ways. First, it implements a very sophisticated system of su-
perpeering designed to avoid scaling problems. This system has been a 
success. The KaZaA superpeer system, from user accounts, produces 
much better performance than even the next-generation Gnutella cli-
ents.190 Such tiering, however, means that not all users are equal; a finite 
number of superpeers do the bulk of the work. 
Second, the FastTrack companies have, like Napster, centralized sev-
eral functions. A central server is still responsible for maintaining user 
registrations, logging users in to the system (in order to maintain statis-
tics), and helping the process of finding peers in the first place. As pre-
viously discussed, efficient operation is difficult to maintain in the face 
 
185 This number is based on Active Users statistics, at www.sylk.com (July 22–Aug. 8, 
2002) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). 
186 Kevin Maney, Fight over digital music filesharing keeps getting weirder, USA Today, 
Sept. 25, 2002, at B3. 
187 It has been reverse-engineered by several groups, who create clients that access the 
FastTrack network without permission. A prominent example is giFT (giFT isn’t FastTrack). 
See generally What is the giFT project?, at 
http://gift.sourceforge.net/docs.php?document=whatis.html (Sept. 14, 2002) (on file with the 
Virginia Law Review Association) (describing giFT and OpenFT). 
188 See Benny Evangelista, Morpheus software morphing: Maker of filesharing pr ogram to 
put limits on MP3 swapping, S.F. Chron., Mar. 14, 2002, at B1. Morpheus later reverted to 
Gnutella, after licensing disagreements with KaZaA. See id. 
189 See Amy Harmon, Music Industry in Global Fight on Web Copies, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 
2002, at A1. 
190 See, e.g., Morpheus 2.0—Revisited, Slyck, at http://www.slyck.com/newsaug2002/ 
081902b.html (Aug. 19, 2002) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (discuss-
ing loss of performance when Morpheus switched from FastTrack to Gnutella network). 
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of radical decentralization. 191 Third, at least one of the FastTrack com-
panies (KaZaA) promotes selfless behavior by sharing user files without 
telling the user. A 2002 Hewlett Packard study demonstrated that the 
KaZaA client made it difficult to know what files users were sharing. 192 
The study demonstrated that many users were sharing all of the files on 
their computers, but were totally unaware of that fact. 193 Increasing the 
number of shared files, of course, improves the performance of the net-
work. 
Finally, the FastTrack companies also adopted another avoidance 
strategy—jurisdictional exit. 194 KaZaA’s parent is incorporated in 
Vanuatu, a group of islands in the South Pacific noted for its lack of a 
copyright law. Grokster maintains its servers in Nevis, a thirty-six 
square mile nation-state in the West Indies. Only Morpheus resides in 
the United States.195 
 
2. Next-Generation Gnutella 
GnutellaNet, meanwhile, continued to operate on a smaller scale. Re-
call that neither GnutellaNet nor any Gnutella client has ever been 
sued—their problems are instead self-generated. Gnutella responded to 
its scaling and social problems by adopting a superpeer design similar to 
that of FastTrack. The best known of the new GnutellaNet developers 
are Bearshare and Limewire. Both compromise a purely decentralized 
design of equal users by distinguishing between high- and low-
bandwidth users and by giving the former more duties. 
The continued growth of Gnutella was marked by a lack of coordina-
tion among developers. As Kelly Truelove writes, “Unfortunately, 
Gnutella has a history of aborted, failed or poorly supported attempts to 
unite developers; the analogy of herding cats has rarely been so apt.”196 
 
191 See supra text accompanying notes 172–82. 
192Nathaniel S. Good & Aaron Krekelberg, Usability and privacy: a study of Kazaa P2P 
file-sharing, HP Laboratories, at http://www.hpl.hp.com/techreports/2002/HPL-2002-
163.pdf (June 5, 2002) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). 
193 Id. 
194 See Harmon, supra note 189, at A1. 
195 See id. 
196 Kelly Truelove, Gnutella: Alive, Well, and Changing Fast, OpenP2P.com, at 
http://www.openp2p.com/pub/a/p2p/2001/01/25/truelove0101.html?page=2 (Jan. 25, 2001) 
(on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). 
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Major Gnutella clients have also taken measures to “engineer good 
behavior.” For example, Bearshare and Limewire block requests from 
clients who do not contribute files to GnutellaNet.197 These efforts, as 
was the case with the FastTrack companies, may make these clients eas-
ier to sue because they suggest an increased quantum of “control” over 
the Gnutella network. 
Finally, despite the change, Gnutella still appears to have scaling 
problems. Statistics kept by Limewire show that, during the first half of 
2002, the network size rarely reached more than 500,000. 198 By July 
2002, GnutellaNet had declined to an average of 160,000 nodes.199 
Gnutella experts point to the same general problem: no control over self-
ish behavior. An anonymous source at Limewire explained the problem: 
“Client ‘A’ may excessively query (hammer) three or more UltraPeers. 
While this may produce plentiful results, the overall affect [s ic] on the 
network is negative as it slows queries from more reasonable clients.”200 
These concerns show the continuing difficulty in balancing decentraliza-
tion and selfless behavior. Yet the fact that GnutellaNet remains unsued 
endows it with an aura of continued importance in the filesharing story. 
D. FastTrack and Gnutella Go to Court 
On October 2, 2001, the music industry sued Grokster, Morpheus, and 
KaZaA: the three principal FastTrack companies.201 This ongoing law-
suit is a signal test of the viability of designing code to avoid legal liabil-
ity. Programmers wrote FastTrack and Gnutella to exploit loopholes left 
by the Napster decision. The case, styled Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios 
v. Grokster, asks whether the P2P programmers have succeeded. The 
initial answer is yes.  
The music industry’s complaint made every effort to stress the simi-
larity between Napster and KaZaA and the other FastTrack companies. 
 
197 Namely, the clients Gnute and Gnutella.it allowed users simply to use Gnute llaNet to 
download files. See id. 
198 Gnutella’s Decline, Slyck, at http://www.slyck.com/newsjuly2002/071702a.html (July 
17, 2002) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief for Copyright Infringement at 2, 8, 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, 2003 WL 186657 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2003) (No. 
Civ.01-08541) (seeking damages and injunctive relief for copyright infringement), available 
at http://www.mpaa.org/Press/KaZaA_Complaint.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2003) (on file with 
the Virginia Law Review Association). 
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Once again it accused the companies of creating “a 21st century piratical 
bazaar.” It noted that the defendants grant access to “a closed computer 
network, controlled by Defendants.” 202 It also put emphasis of the fact 
that communications are centrally encrypted.203 The complaint high-
lights these facts to support the argument that the FastTrack companies, 
like Napster, “are capable of controlling the activities of their users.”204  
But the facts did not support this contention (by design). District 
Judge Stephen Wilson, granting summary judgment in favor of Grokster 
and Morpheus,205 refused to buy the comparison to Napster (the pro-
gram). The opinion suggests that the changes in design “worked,” at 
least with respect to negating the element of control that sealed Nap-
ster’s fate.  
Just as in Napster, the court took the issue of control as the sine qua 
non of contributory liability. As the court put it: “[T]he critical question 
is whether [defendants] do anything, aside from distributing software, to 
actively facilitate—or whether they could do anything to stop—their us-
ers’ infringing activity.”206 It was here that the changes in design made a 
difference. Judge Wilson pointed out, in a crucial factual holding: 
Neither StreamCast nor Grokster facilitates the exchange of files be-
tween users in the way Napster did. Users connect to the respective 
networks, select which files to share, send and receive searches, and 
download files, all with no material involvement of Defendants. If ei-
ther Defendant closed their doors and deactivated all computers within 
their control, users of their products could continue sharing files with 
little or no interruption.207 
As noted above, Gnutella and FastTrack embody a self-conscious ef-
fort to make P2P filesharing more like the VCR or photocopier. And the 
court accepted just that rationale, concluding, “Grokster and StreamCast 
are not significantly different from companies that sell home video 
recorders or copy machines, both of which can be and are used to  
202 Id. (seeking damages and injunctive relief for copyright infringement). 
203 Id. at 2–3. 
204 Id. at 10. 
205 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., __F. Supp. 2d__, 2003 WL 
1989129 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2003). Default judgment was entered against a shell company 
named KaZaA BV, holding no relevant assets, who declined to defend the lawsuit. See id at 
4 n.2. Sharman Networks, the current operator of the KaZaA system, was not a party to the 
motions. See id. at 6. 
206 Id. at 19. 
207 Id. at 23–24. 
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corders or copy machines, both of which can be and are used to infringe 
copyrights.”208 Hence, “absent evidence of active and substantial contri-
bution to the infringement itself, Defendants cannot be liable.”209 
Will the judgment survive appeal? There are reasons to suspect it will 
not. The district court’s decision ultimately depends on Sony as inter-
preted by Napster. Sony in turn, can be read as a policy judgment aimed 
principally at correcting a perceived market failure.210 While clearer in 
hindsight, it is apparent that the Sony decision correctly addressed a 
market failure.211 The VCR broadened the addressable market for televi-
sion shows (via time-shifting) and for movies (via rentals). Though there 
is an argument that filesharing helps the music industry, the desirability 
of the “help” is much less apparent.212 Filesharing looks more like a re-
placement for legitimate music sales; such reasoning may compel a 
court to find some way to assess liability on P2P developers regardless 
of the Napster precedent. In addition, the ratio of infringing to non-
infringing use must be at the forefront of the ultimate policy judgment in 
this area. If the alleged non-infringing uses retain their de minimis char-
acter the Court of Appeals will presumably feel that there is little conse-
quence in ruling against the P2P filesharing companies. 
Perhaps the only policy reason to think otherwise is an institutional 
argument. Ultimate settlement of the filesharing dispute, the argument 
goes, is a task for Congress; and a decision against the copyright owners 
will force such settlement. Such “settlement-forcing” decisions in copy-
right have a long pedigree, from the 1908 piano-roll case White-Smith 
Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,213 to the cable-broadcast decisions 
of the 1960s and 1970s.214 Both prompted Congressional action to settle 
a dispute between an incumbent and challenger technology.215 Judge 
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209 Id. 
210 See Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis 
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Wilson clearly had this in mind, writing “[w]hile the Court need not de-
cide whether steps could be taken to reduce the susceptibility of such 
software to unlawful use . . . additional legislative guidance may be 
well-counseled.”216 It remains to be seen whether the Courts of Appeals 
will think that trying to force settlement of copyright disputes remains 
an appropriate court function. 
E. The Reaction to the Reaction 
The recording industry’s reactions to P2P filesharing is a paradigm 
for understanding the modern face of regulatory competition. As preced-
ing Sections have shown, the filesharer’s comparative advantage lay in 
designing code to avoid copyright law. The recording industry, mean-
while, has invested in a broader range of mechanisms to influence law 
and its effects. The content industry invested in changing the law (by 
controlling access, increasing intermediary liability, and increasing 
criminal liability), in changing social norms, and in changing code to at-
tack P2P networks. The extent of increased investment can be seen from 
the annual increases in the budget of the RIAA itself. In the early 1990s, 
the RIAA’s budget was estimated at $10 million. 217 By 1995, the RIAA 
was spending $14.7 million. By 2000, the budget had tripled to $39 mil-
lion and in 2001 stood at $44 million.218 
1. Investments in Change 
The recording industry’s investments in legal change are most promi-
nent. In the 1990s, the content industry invested considerable time and 
energy to ensure the passage of three critical laws to buttress copyright 
enforcement: the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA,  219 the 
ISP-liability sections of that same bill, 220 and the enhancement of copy-
right’s criminal penalties in the No Electronic Theft (“NET”) Act.221 
The anti-circumventions provisions of the DMCA reinforce various 
technological techniques of preventing copying by criminalizing cir-
 
216 Grokster, __F. Supp. 2d__ at 33. 
217 See Bill Holland, Tougher RIAA gives pirates chase but still running uphill, BillBoard, 
Mar. 14, 1992, available at 1992 WL 11645300. 
218 See Bill Holland, Performers Give Testimony Before Judges And Lawmakers, Bill-
Board, Sept. 22, 2001, available at 2001 WL 24692410. 
219 17 U.S.C. § 512(1998). 
220 17 U.S.C. § 512(1998) 
221 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 506 (2000). 
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cumvention of copy protection systems.222 The provisions can be under-
stood as an effort to restore an eroding gatekeeper system. Technologi-
cal copy protection “respecializes” the creation and mass distribution of 
copyrighted works, while the DMCA’s anti-circumvention law makes it 
a crime to undo the respecialization. 223 The law can be understood as an 
effort to return content owners to the 1970s, when they were free to sit 
back and police the few intermediaries licensed to access the copy-
protected content. 224 The anti-circumvention provisions are usually dis-
cussed in conjunction with the much-discussed possibility of effective 
digital rights management. 225 Some have speculated that there may be a 
future where content owners manage to encrypt content so carefully and 
comprehensively from the outset, and maintain their control continu-
ously, that the code prevents infringement ex ante.  226 Such efforts re-
main in their early stages and are highly speculative, but they would 
eventually transform the economics of copyright enforcement. 227 
The ISP-specific sections of the DMCA, Section 512 et seq., repre-
sent the culmination of an effort to replace the lost intermediaries of 
times past with ISPs. There have been a few attempts to use these sec-
tions to target filesharing. In the summer of 2002, the RIAA filed a law-
suit against various telephone companies who operate the backbone of 
the Internet, based on their failure to contain overseas copyright in-
fringement, but it dropped the suit a week later. 228 More recently, using a 
 
222 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1998). 
223 A more recent example in the same vein is the well-known “Hollings Bill.” Consumer 
Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act, S. 2048, 107th Cong. (2002). The bill 
would require all “digital media devices” to include copy protection technology in their de-
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copyright infringement on electronics manufacturers. 
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response to filesharing. Unless completely successful in blocking access, digital protection 
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available through filesharing networks. 
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226 These ideas are explored more fully in Lessig, supra note 149, at 177–99. 
227 Cf. Ku, supra note 225, at 275–76 (arguing against copyright protection for digital 
works because the economics of digital technology undercuts prior assumptions about the 
efficacy of a private property regime for information). 
228 Alex Pham, Tactics Toughen on Music Piracy, L.A. Times, Aug. 21, 2002, at C1; Alex 
Pham, Technology RIAA Drops Suit Targeting Piracy Site, L.A. Times, Aug. 22, 2002, at 
C5. 
 
162 Virginia Law Review Vol. 89:nnn 
different section of the DMCA, the RIAA successfully convinced a fed-
eral judge to require Verizon to identify a subscriber accused of 
downloading hundreds of copyrighted files in a single day. 229 
Finally, the efforts to pass the NET Act of 1997 and subsequent lob-
bying represent an effort to turn to the criminal side of copyright to en-
hance primary enforcement. Under the little-noticed NET Act, the fed-
eral government may criminally prosecute relatively minor copyright 
infringements.230 While this criminal statute still requires “private finan-
cial gain,” the NET Act defines “financial gain” to include “receipt, or 
expectation of receipt, of anything of value, including the receipt of 
other copyrighted works.”231 This definition makes quid pro quo filetrad-
ing potentially criminal.  
Copyright owners have mounted an effort to convince the Justice De-
partment to enforce the NET Act against individual peer filesharers.232 
This amounts to an attempt to increase the sanction, if not the probabil-
ity of detection, for copyright infringement. The untested question re-
mains whether either criminal or civil primary enforcement will be ef-
fective in deterring illegal P2P filesharing, given the limits of primary 
enforcement in producing deterrence. 233 
2. Extralegal Investments 
In addition to legal changes, the recording industry has also invested 
in trying to change the social norms surrounding copyright infringement 
and has made some efforts to combat P2P filesharing directly. As dis-
cussed above,234 when it comes to copying files, people have proven to 
be unaffected by the ethical tug of the copyright statute. The software 
and recording industries have spent a decade trying to change that atti-
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tude. The RIAA’s “Sound-Byting” campaign, for example, is an invest-
ment to try to change the attitudes of college students toward copyright 
infringement. The central message of this campaign is: “[U]ploading and 
downloading somebody else’s music without their permission isn’t just 
against the law. It’s a rip-off. Simple as that.” 235 Hilary Rosen, the 
President of the RIAA, even participated in a well-publicized public de-
bate at Oxford, arguing that illegal filesharing is immoral. 236 As the sta-
tistics cited here and the Pew Internet Project Study discussed above in-
dicate, 237 it is unclear whether these efforts have had much success in 
changing public attitudes toward filesharing.  
Perhaps most interestingly, content owners may also be taking a page 
from the book of P2P designers themselves, using code to influence the 
enforcement of copyright law by attacking the P2P networks that un-
dermine copyright enforcement. Reports on the use of attacks on P2P 
networks are hard to verify. However, there are several methods through 
which content owners might try to disable P2P networks. One method 
seeks to decrease the attractiveness of P2P networks, often by flooding 
the network with dummy or broken music files. 238 Users then must 
spend more time looking for good files, increasing the attractiveness of 
conventional distribution channels. Another method would simply attack 
important network nodes using techniques familiar to computer hackers. 
239 More fanciful examples of this type of strategy include that of a virus 
designed to detect illegally copied materials.240 The extent to which 
these methods are used today is a carefully guarded secret.241 The con-
tinued activity of peer filesharing networks, however, suggests either 
limited success or limited usage of such techniques. 
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On June 25, 2002, Representative Howard Berman of North Holly-
wood, California proposed that “[t]echnological self-help” should help 
provide the solution to “unbridled” peer network piracy.242 He proposed 
a bill that would give legal license for copyright owners to disrupt peer 
networks.243 Representative Berman phrased his support of the bill, in-
terestingly, in terms of “freedom to respond”: 
[W]hile P2P technology is free to innovate new and more efficient 
methods of distribution that further exacerbate the piracy problem, 
copyright owners are not equally free to craft technological responses. 
This is not fair and I believe Congress should free copyright creators 
to develop and deploy technological tools to address P2P piracy.244 
The Berman bill, while unlikely to pass, shows the dramatic extent and 
even creativity of efforts to gain advantage in the regulatory competition 
surrounding copyright. 
The story of the competition between the RIAA and P2P users deliv-
ers a snapshot of the future of understanding compliance and legal ef-
fects. A law’s meaning and effects, success or failure, seem ever less a 
function of drafting or enforcement. Rather, the question is what 
forces—social, economic, technological or otherwise—may be recruited 
for or against the cause. 
IV. THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF P2P FILESHARING 
“As the largest grassroots effort in the history of the world, file trading 
is essentially the average person’s way of saying we don’t agree with 
the status quo.”245 
Over the last four years, P2P networks have provided a sub-group of 
media consumers with the equivalent of a temporary repeal of copyright 
laws for the technologically inclined. How can one explain the growth 
 
242 Press Release, Representative Howard Berman, Berman Announces Legislation To Foil 
Peer To Peer Piracy, at http://www.house.gov/berman/pr062502.htm (June 25, 2002) (on file 
with the Virginia Law Review Association). 
243 To amend Title 17, United States Code, to limit the liability of copyright owners for 
protecting their works on peer-to-peer networks: Hearing on H.R. 5211 Before the House, 
107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Rep. Howard Berman). 
244 Press Release, supra note 242. 
245 Richard Menta, RIAA and MPAA sue Morpheus, Grokster and KaZaa, 
MP3newswire.net, at http://www.mp3newswire.net/stories/2001/sue_morpheus.html (Oct. 3, 
2001) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). 
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and popularity of the peer filesharing movement? This final Part ana-
lyzes the particular fit between P2P filesharing and its beneficiaries. It 
shows first, that P2P may represent the rational exploitation of the larger 
group of music consumers by a subset of computer savvy P2P users, and 
second, that peer filesharing uniquely suited the disorganized nature of 
copyright consumers as a group. 
A. Copyright’s Divided Subjects 
One reason P2P filesharing may have been successful is because users 
rationally exploited “regular” consumers who lack the knowledge or re-
sources to use P2P networks. In the standard (if sometimes disputed) ac-
count, copyright law is said to serve the interests of content consumers. 
246 The law provides financial and, debatably, expressive incentives to 
create materials that would otherwise not exist. If this is right, why 
would consumers ever want to disobey copyright law? 
The intuitive answer is that everyone likes getting things for free, but 
the answer from economic theory is more enlightening. While comply-
ing with some form of copyright law may serve the collective interest of 
consumers, it is not in any given individual’s interest to comply. More 
generally, the logic of collective action suggests that the ideal strategy 
for an individual or sub-group under copyright law is to create a system 
that limits evasion of copyright to an “in-group,” leaving everyone else 
to pay for the incentives to create. To defect while others remain in 
compliance is to live in the game theorist’s version of utopia. 
In the mid-to-late 1990s, an important demographic trend favored the 
development of just such a strategy. Social commentators began to use 
the term “digital divide”247 to refer to the fact—confirmed by empirical 
 
246 Whether copyright does indeed encourage creative expression is a question beyond the 
scope of this study of response. I therefore do not address the position held by some that 
copyright retards the creation of content. For examples of such positions see, e.g., Eben Mo-
glen, Liberation Musicology, The Nation, Mar. 12, 2001, at 5; Mark S. Nadel, Questioning 
The Economic Justification For (and Thus Constitutionality of) Copyright Law’s Prohibition 
Against Unauthorized Copying: § 106 (unpublished manuscript), at 
http://www.aei.brookings.org/admin/pdffiles/Nadel.pdf (Jan. 2003) (on file with the Virginia 
Law Review Association); cf. Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of 
Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281 (1970) 
(questioning whether granting copyrights in books and computer programs is really neces-
sary to provide incentives to create and publish them). 
247 The question of who coined the term “digital divide” remains something of a mystery. 
See Sharon Foster & Adrianna Borkowski, Who Coined the Term? 
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study—that there was a sharp division between a relatively small num-
ber of computer literate, connected citizens and the rest of Americans. In 
1998, for instance, the Clinton Administration found that college-
educated Americans were almost ten times more likely to own a com-
puter than those without any high school education (63.2% vs. 6.8%). 248 
The disparity in Internet access was even more prominent: 38.4% of col-
lege-educated Americans had access, as compared to 9.6% of those with 
a high school diploma, and just 1.8% of those without any high school 
education. 249 
The existence of this division in content consumers provided ideal 
conditions for the development of a copyright evasion system that could 
be limited to a sub-group (the technologically savvy). Peer filesharing 
networks made that system. By requiring at least a computer connection 
and Internet access (and optimally broadband access and open-source 
know-how), the networks guaranteed that only a certain percentage of 
Americans would ever be able to take full advantage of the defection 
from the copyright regime. 
It is unlikely that the programmers of Napster and other applic ations 
actively considered the dynamics of collective action before writing 
code. But because filesharing remains confined to a limited group, 
filesharers can see that their actions will not eliminate all incentives to 
create music or seriously impoverish artists. Users of peer networks are 
a select group that could and still do live by slightly different rules. 
B. Disorganized Political Action 
Even as a sub-group, however, P2P users remain disorganized. The 
second reason that P2P was successful was that, as an avoidance mecha-
nism, it did not require collective action. 
That content consumers have not had a strong influence on the shape 
of copyright law is well-documented. The lobbying process that led to 
the 1976 Copyright Act is a leading example. The Act was the workpro-
duct of a twenty-one-year-long negotiation between affected industry 
 
Origin of ‘Digital Divide’ Escapes Even the Experts, at http:// 
www1.soc.american.edu/students/ij/co_3/digitaldivide/history.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2003) 
(on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). 
248 See Nat’l Telecommunications and Info. Admin., Falling Through The Net II: New 
Data On The Digital Divide 4 (July 1998). 
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groups.250 Studies suggest, however, that groups representing consumer 
interests had little or no influence on the shape of the 1976 Act. Profes-
sor Jessica Litman concluded, “[T]he citizenry’s interest in copyright 
and copyrighted works was too varied and complex to be amenable to 
interest-group championship.”251 
These studies show what is obvious: For an average consumer, lobby-
ing for copyright change is expensive, likely futile, and, even if success-
ful, an impossible change on which to capitalize. As a result, very few 
consumers devote themselves to copyright lobbying. 
Enter P2P. Individuals  who participate in a peer filesharing network 
immediately capture for themselves the benefits of their investment. 
They save money on the music they download for free, with no need to 
share those savings with others who did not participate. Moreover, the 
programmers of peer filesharing programs do not, other than sometimes 
adhering to a common protocol, even necessarily need to work together 
or coordinate their efforts.252 
It might be difficult to convince users to contribute, as opposed to 
take, from the common pool of shared songs. The process of sharing, 
however, has a relatively low cost. Moreover, as Professor Strahilevitz 
demonstrates, the design of P2P clients can lead users to believe that 
they are participating in a community, triggering norms of reciprocity.253 
One salient question is whether the objective of collective action 
moves to writing the peer application itself (the Napster program, etc.). 
This shift does not seem to occur. First, provided that the program can 
be sold, the programmer can appropriate some of the value produced by 
the evasion of copyright law and can avoid the collective action prob-
lem. Second, even if the collective action problem persists, the invest-
ment needed to write a peer networking program may be small enough 
 
250 See Litman, supra note 103, at 48–63 (discussing the negotiations behind the 1976 
Act); see also Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 Or. L. 
Rev. 275, 279–82 (1989) (same). 
251 Litman, supra note 103, at 52. 
252 The creation of the protocols does represent a collective action problem if they are open 
(free for anyone to develop around). Interestingly, the major open peer filesharing protocol, 
Gnutella, was produced by an open-source programming effort. Open-source programming, 
motivated by technological challenges, has proven its ability to create public goods. See Pe-
ter Kollock, The economies of online cooperation: gifts and public goods in cyberspace, in  
Communities in Cyberspace 220, 230–35 (Marc A. Smith & Peter Kollock eds., 1999) (ex-
amining the creation of the Linux operating system as an example of a public good created 
online despite potential colle ctive action problems). 
253 See Strahilevitz, supra note 12, at 547–71. 
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that the programmer is motivated to write it if for no other reason than 
just to serve his own needs. Third, the collaborative structure of open-
source software development may play a role in developing responses 
that rely on non-monetary incentives. I will examine each explanation in 
turn. 
A program is a private good. If it is sold or otherwise used to generate 
returns, its developer has the appropriate incentive to respond on behalf 
of the group. This incentive is, apparently, what has driven much of the 
peer filesharing response so far. For Shawn Fanning, the founder of 
Napster, the returns were reputational. As Time remarked, he “reached a 
level of fame unprecedented for a 19-year old who is neither a sports 
hero nor a pop star.”254 But the financial incentives for writing response 
programs have not proved overwhelming. 255 Most peer filesharing com-
panies today depend on the dot-com model of deriving revenue from 
user traffic. Some developers claim that advertising revenue is enough to 
stay in business. For example, the developer of WinMX (yet another 
peer filesharing application) stated, “We stay in operation by keeping 
our costs low . . . . [W]e think it’s smarter to skip the spyware, generate 
revenue from quality ad exposures on www.winmx.com, and spend the 
money on important things such as a small yet well rewarded develop-
ment team, legal contingency funds, etc.”256 
More seasoned companies, however, question the advertising model. 
KaZaA, for example, depends on selling pop-up ads257 and plans to har-
ness and sell the unused computing resources of its millions of peered 
users (derisively referred to as a “spyware” strategy).258 It has freely 
admitted that the online advertising model does not deliver enough reve-
nue for it to support continued development.259 
 
254 Karl Taro Greenfeld, Meet the Napster, Time, Oct. 2, 2000, at 60. 
255 See John Borland, Rocky financial road awaits file swappers, CNET News.com, at 
http:news.com.com/2102-1023-273245.html (Sept. 21, 2001) (on file with the Virginia Law 
Review Association) (describing the failure of file swapping programs to make any money). 
256 WinMX Interview with Kevin Hearn, President, Front Code Technologies, Slyck, at 
http://www.slyck.com/newsjuly2002/071002c.html (July 10, 2002) (on file with the Virginia 
Law Review Association). 
257 See Erick Schonfeld, The True Cost of Free Music, Business 2.0 (May 24, 2002), at 
http://www.business2.com/articles/web/print/0,1650,40816,00.html (on file with the Virginia 
Law Review) (describing KaZaA’s business model). 
258 This strategy is referred to as “spyware” because it pretends to be performing one func-
tion while actually performing another. Spyware also sometimes refers to programs that col-
lect and store information about the user. 
259 Id. 
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Ironically, this suggests that the continuing development of peer 
filesharing may itself depend on copyright law’s protection. That is to 
say, if other revenue models prove unsuccessful, developers may have to 
turn to selling programs or selling membership.260 Their ability to do so 
will depend on copyright protection, either against unauthorized distri-
bution of the software client (perhaps using a peer network) or unauthor-
ized circumvention of a copy-protection scheme. Peer developers may 
have to enlist copyright processes in their effort to evade copyright laws. 
They may then, in a further twist, find their tools of copyright evasion 
turned against them. 
Alternatively, programming a peer response may be inexpensive 
enough that some individuals will always be willing to undertake the 
project for their own personal benefit. If a college student would other-
wise spend $500 a year on music, and if his time is not otherwise valu-
able, he might consider it a worthwhile investment to program an im-
proved filesharing application. Similarly, it could be that the challenge 
of peer networking development will continue to attract the collabora-
tive attention of open-source developers. How far the open-source 
movement will take peer filesharing is an open question—it depends on 
how interesting the problem remains to programmers.261 
As suggested by the change/avoidance dichotomy in Part I, one of the 
reasons for the success of P2P as a mechanism of legal influence is that 
it avoids the collective action problem inherent in change mechanisms. 
It has worked because certain members of the group have appropriate 
incentives to write programs that then lower the cost of the copyright 
system for all computer-savvy users. This fact explains the mass popu-
larity of P2P among disorganized consumers. As a result, Napster and 
other programs have become an alternative to political lobbying less by 
choice than by default. 
 
260 For example, BearShare, at www.bearshare.com, already sells a “professional” version. 
261 Opinions on what motivates open-source programmers vary. See, e.g., Kollock, supra 
note 252, at 220–39 (describing a gift model); Eben Moglen, Anarchism Triumphant: Free 
Software and the Death of Copyright, 4 First Monday 8, at 
http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue4_8/moglen/index.html (Aug. 2, 1999) (on file with 
the Virginia Law Review Association) (arguing that economics cannot explain why people 
write free software). 
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CONCLUSION 
Finding bold predictions for what political programming projects 
means for the future of governance is not difficult to do. John Perry Bar-
low’s prophecies, for example, have not been understated: 
What’s happening with global, peer-to-peer networking is not alto-
gether different from what happened when the American colonists re-
alized they were poorly served by the British Crown: The colonists 
were obliged to cast off that power and develop an economy better 
suited to their new environment . . . . No law can be successfully im-
posed on a huge population that does not morally support it and pos-
sesses easy means for its invisible evasion.262 
My own prophecies are somewhat more modest. The ways groups in-
fluence their government and the effects of its laws are changing. But 
the effects are ambiguous. At best, the story suggests that groups that 
have never fared well in the political process, due to disorganization or 
unpopularity, will gain the most. At worst, already-privileged computer 




262 See John Perry Barlow, The Next Economy of Ideas, Wired 8.10 (Oct. 2000). 
